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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines whether application of the Piotroski F _Score (Piotroski, 2000), to the 
South African market is feasible and whether or not the distribution of returns earned by an 
investor can be shifted upward through use of this investment screen. Initial analysis seeks to 
faithfully replicate Piotroski's methodology although alternative samples have also been 
considered. This paper shows that, although not statistically significant, the selection of 
financially strong high book-to-market firms can yield impressive results and can be applied 
to the South African market, albeit with less impressive and convincing results than those 
garnered elsewhere. In all tested cases, a portfolio comprised of financially strong firms 
having a high F _Score outperform a portfolio comprised of firms classified as financially 
weak and can be statistically significant when applied to ulterior samples. In addition, the 
mean return of financially strong firms over a two year investment period is substantially 
higher than that of the entire portfolio being analysed. Within each of the tested portfolios, it 
would appear that the benefits of financial statement analysis are not associated with firm 
size, Altman Z-Score or historical change in profitability. Overall this paper would suggest, 
as does Piotroski's, that the market does not fully take historical financial information into 
account in prices in a timely manner and that although not statistically significant, the use of 
Piotroski's F _Score does enable an investor to discriminate between financially strong and 
weak firms and may allow for improved returns. The lack of statistical significance is may be 
a function of limitations imposed by the availability and quality of data. 
[KEYWORDS: Financial statement analysis; market efficiency, fundamental analysis, 
Piotroski.] 
i. introduction 
Extensive research has been conducted on the high book-to-market investment strategy (e.g. 
Fama and French, 1992, 1995; and Lakonishok et aI., 1994). In the South African context, 
similar research has been conducted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (Auret and 
Sinclaire, 2006). In all instances it has been shown that a high book-to-market investment 
strategy yields superior returns as compared to those of the market itself. However, the 
success of this strategy is primarily the result of a small subset of firms yielding exceptional 
returns. 
This paper shows that a 12-month buy-and-hold investor would have earned a mean return 
at least 12O/C above the market by investing in high book-to-market firms over the 2005 to 
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2010 period. A 24-month buy-and-hold investor would have earned a mean return at least 
34.69c above that of the market over this same period. These gains are despite just 43.72% 
and 31.69c of these high book-to-market firms yielding positive market-adjusted returns over 
each of the respective periods. Given that less than 45% of all high book-to-market firms 
yield positive market-adjusted returns and the diversity of returns evidenced within these high 
book-to-market portfolios, investors could be rewarded by discriminating between future 
strong and weak firms. This paper, much like Piotroski's, asks whether a fundamental, 
accounting-based analysis technique can discriminate between high book-to-market firms 
that will outperform their peers and those that will not. 
A high book-to-market ratio is frequently an indication of recent or perceived financial 
distress (Fama and French, 1992; Chen and Zhang, 1998; and Vassalou and Xing, 2004). 
Even should this not be the case, firms displaying this characteristic commonly suffer from 
thin trading or analyst neglect (Lakonishok et aI., 1994; McNichols and O'Brien, 1997) with 
one reason being that analysts underestimate future prospects of high book-to-market firms 
(Dechow and Sloan, 1997). In addition, Cai and Zheng (2004), and Griffin et al. (2003), were 
able to show that many institutional investors focus on growth / glamour stocks as they are 
momentum return seekers despite there being no empirical evidence to suggest that such a 
strategy yields significant future abnormal returns. 
As such. the very nature of high book-to-market firms makes them uniquely suited to an 
accounting-based fundamental analysis strategy. Lack of analyst forecasts and analyst 
following restricts the ability of the firm to communicate informally. The spectre of financial 
distress renders the limited informal communication undertaken by the firm subject to severe 
scepticism, with good reason according to Koch (2000), and further limits the rigour and 
credibility of traditional discounted cash flow or multiple based valuation techniques. A 
technique that relies primarily on reliable financial information - albeit historical - and the 
fundamental financial characteristics of a firm is therefore likely to be the most valuable tool 
for investment analysis. 
This paper seeks to employ the Piotroski F _Score to assess whether discrimination 
between high book-to-market firms with above-average returns and those without. is possible 
in the South African market. In addition, it attempts to evaluate alternative portfolios 
comprised of more discerning selection criteria and broader scope. If successful, it will show 
that South African investors can create a stronger value portfolio through the use of simple 
accounting-based analysis on historical financial information. In order to be effective, it will 
be necessary to be able to distinguish between those firms that will yield above average 
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future returns and those that will not. As expected, the data does confirm that the mean return 
of a high-book to market investment strategy exceeds the mean return of the market as a 
whole. Further. the results seem to indicate that while it is possible to identify those firms that 
will underperform the market, it is not always possible to select financially strong portfolio's 
that will outperform the market. In every instance firms having a low F _Score and thus 
identified as being financially weak underperformed both the market and population within 
which they were included while high F _Score and thus financially sound firms consistently 
outperformed the market but at times underperformed the population within which they were 
included unless held for a period of 24 months. Although few of the results were found to be 
statistically significant, it is possible to draw the inference from this dataset that a 24 month 
buy-and-hold strategy for high F _Score firms and a shorting strategy for low F _Score firms 
over a similar period would yield the best results. Of particular interest is that while the 
picking of firms based on Piotroski's F _Score is not convincingly conclusive, applying a firm 
size, level of distress and / or historical change in profitability filter in no way improves on or 
provides additional reliability to the initial analysis. In fact, the only additional analysis 
seeming to provide further benefit is the application of Altman's Z-Score where firms having 
a supposedly high level of bankruptcy risk are removed from the sample of high book-to-
market firms thereby eliminating some financially distressed firms which understandably 
underperform in subsequent periods. 
The next section of this paper is intended to outline prevIOUS research pertaining to 
accounting-based investment techniques and in particular those papers related to a high book-
to-market investment strategy. It will also outline the nine financial signals that Piotroski uses 
to discriminate between high book-to-market firms with exceptional returns and those 
without. Section 3 specifies the research design and empirical tests employed by both 
Piotroski and this paper, while section 4 presents the various outcomes of these tests on three 
separate samples of the population and an overall assessment of the efficacy of this technique 
in shifting the distribution of the returns earned by a South African investor. Section 5 is the 
conclusion. 
2. Literature Review and Motivation 
2.1 PRIOR ACCOUNTING-BASED INVESTMENT STRATEGY RESEARCH 
Researchers have, for decades, attempted to develop an investment strategy which will 
consistently yield superior returns. Fundamental to this is the ability to discriminate between 
firms that will yield exceptional returns in future, and those that will not. Frankel and Lee 
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(1998). propose the purchase of stocks where fundamental values appear to predict future 
prospects in excess of those that stock prices might suggest. This strategy identifies 
undervalued stocks through the use of the discounted residual income model while 
concurrently considering consensus earnings forecasts - specifically the U.S. Institution 
Brokers' Estimate Forecasts (UB/E/S) - as proxy for future earnings. This strategy was shown 
to be successful. over a three-year investment period. at generating significant positive 
returns. LaPorta (1996). was able to show that systematic errors in market expectations. 
where investors form incorrect earnings expectations and stock markets are not fully 
efficient. can partially account for superior returns earned by value stocks (with high book-to-
market firms explicitly included within this category). This too would seem to indicate the 
possibility of discrimination between firms that will yield exceptional future returns and those 
that will not. 
Research with a more fundamental approach has shown on numerous occasions that 
investors can benefit from focused investing on specific indicators of financial performance. 
These papers suggest that reliance can be placed on the market's lack of ability to fully 
process the implications of particular financial indicators. This research includes, but is not 
limited to. post-earnings announcement drift where cumulative stock returns continue to 'drift 
up' for up to 60 days after an unexpectedly good earnings announcement or vice versa but 
where the extent of post-earnings announcement drift is negatively correlated with the 
percentage of institutional ownership holding stocks in the firm and hence relevant for 
growth but not value stocks (Foster et aI., 1984; Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990; Bartov et 
aI., 2000; and Ke and Ramalingegowda, 2005), accruals where undue attention is paid to 
earnings without fully considering the implications of accruals and the related consequences 
for cash flow (Sloan, 1996), seasoned equity offerings where firms that issue equity, whether 
an initial public offering or a seasoned equity offering, significantly underperform relative to 
similar non-issuing firms for five years after the offering date with similar underperformance 
being evident for both small and large firms as well as both growth and value firms 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Jegadeesh, 2000; Pontiff and Woodgate. 2008), dividend 
omissions I decreases where the initiation of a dividend is associated with a mean price 
increase while the omission of a dividend payment is associated with a relatively larger mean 
price decrease (Michaely, et aI., 1995) and repurchases where a buy-and-hold decision in the 
month following the repurchase announcement on average realizes a return over the next four 
years that is 12O/C above that of a control portfolio (Ikenberry et aI.. 1995) although Zhang 
(2005), finds that repurchasing firms do not seem to exhibit superior abnormal performance 
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over long horizons when making actual share repurchases unless the repurchase is made by a 
small firm with a high book-to-market ratio. 
Arguably more robust techniques employ multiple pieces of information located in the 
firm's financial statements over and above reliance on a single fundamental signal. Ou and 
Penman (1989), and Holthausen and Larcker (1992), find that financial statements have 
valuable information content and that, when certain of these numbers are summarized in to 
one measure, it is possible to enhance valuation through the more accurate prediction of 
future earnings. Lev and Thiagarajan (1993), make use of twelve financial signals indicated 
to be pertinent by market analysts's rather than statistical search procedure. By using an 
aggregate score reflecting the information in the fundamentals and an earnings response 
coefficient together with future earnings growth they are able to demonstrate a significant 
relationship between value-relevant information and contemporaneous returns after 
controlling for current earnings innovations, firm size and macroeconomic conditions. 
Abarbanell and Bushee (1997), further scrutinise the Lev and Thiagarajan (1993), signals 
and find that they have the ability to explain both future earnings changes and future analyst 
revisions. Following on the success of this study Abarbanell and Bushee (1998), went on to 
show that an investment strategy grounded in these twelve fundamental signals does yield 
significant abnormal returns. 
Similar to Lev and Thiagarajan (1993), and likely satisfied with the work of Abarbanell 
and Bushee (1997; 1998), Piotroski (2000), chose to consider nine financial signals to assess 
a firm's likely future financial performance. The nine signals were identified through 
professional and academic articles and once again, as with Lev and Thiagarjan's signals, 
were not based on statistical search procedure. No assertion was made that these nine signals 
were optimal for distinguishing good investments from bad investments but merely that these 
were likely appropriate signals for assessing the well-being of a firm based on three key 
performance areas i.e. profitability, financial leverage / liquidity and operating efficiency. 
The population to which this research was applied consisted of high book-to-market firms. 
A portfolio constructed with this characteristic meets the definition of a 'value' portfolio and 
is likely, as evidenced through many research papers (e.g. Fama and French, 1992, 1995; and 
Lakonishok et aI., 1994; Auret and Sinciaire, 2006), to provide superior returns as compared 
to the market - even before additional discrimination. Remarkably, Piotroski's study was able 
to show an additional increase in the mean return earned by a high book-to-market investor of 
at least 7.5o/c annually through the selection of high book-to-market, financially strong firms 
based on Piotroksi' s model. . 
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In a similar vein, Mohanram (2005), developed a GSCORE to assist with fundamental 
analysis for growth oriented, low book-to-market stocks. Mohanram focused on traditional 
fundamentals such as earnings and cash flows while including other measures tailored for 
growth firms such as earnings stability, growth stability, intensity of research and 
development. capital expenditure and advertising. A long-short strategy based on this 
GSCORE was found to earn significant excess returns, though most of the returns were 
realised from the short side. Results were robust in partitions of size, analyst following and 
liquidity. They also persisted after controlling for momentum and accruals. 
Duong, Pescetto & Santamaria (201O), believe there to be several concerns relating to both 
the Piotroski (2000), and Mohanram (2005), analysis and results. The two most pertinent of 
these being that firstly, while both Piotroski and Mohanram show that their models perform 
strikingly well when applied to high and low book-to-market stocks respectively, neither 
model's performance has been tested academically outside of the chosen samples. Secondly, 
due to well-documented concerns regarding the drawing of inferences from statistical tests of 
long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns (e.g. Kothari and Warner, 1997; Barber and Lyon, 
1997), it is not possible to infer whether Piotroski' s or Mohanram' s models illustrate a case 
of market mispricing, or rational behaviour. This is a distinction which Duong and his fellow 
authors believe to be central to understanding the usefulness of these models. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to distinguish between market mispricing or rational 
behaviour but it is acknowledged that adaptability to the South African market and efficacy to 
discriminate between those high book-to-market firms that will yield exceptional returns and 
those that will not, will concomitantly expand the sample against which Piotroski's model has 
been tested and if successful, will somewhat mitigate the need for interpretation as to whether 
this efficacy arises through market mispricing or rational behaviour. It should be noted that 
similar work has been done by Lopes and Galdi (2007) in BraziL and Almas and Duque 
(2008) on Euronext markets (Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels and Lisbon). Lopes and Galdi use 
Piotroski's model to show that an investor could have changed the mean of his high book-to-
market portfolio one-year market-adjusted returns from 5.7o/c to 26.7o/c by selecting 
financially strong i.e. high Piotroski F _Score, high book-to-market firms listed in the Sao 
Paulo Stock Exchange over the 1994-2004 period. They were also able to show that an 
investor could have changed his high book-to-market portfolio two-year market-adjusted 
returns from 42.4O/C to 120.2% using the same selection techniques over this same period. 
Both results were statistically significant. Almas and Duque used three different accounting 
based investment strategies to separate good from troubled firms. They were able to show 
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that Piotroski's investment strategy was the most efficient of these three and that application 
thereof increased the mean annual return in their high book-to-market portfolio by a 
statistically significant. 9.2%, when applied to a sample of European stocks over an eleven 
year period. Of interest is that both academic applications of the Piotroski F _Score outside of 
the U.S. market yielded results which were superior to those attained in Piotroski's original 
paper. 
One final inclusion to this research is that of Altman's Z-Score. Altman (1968), uses 
multiple discriminant analysis to establish five key ratios with corresponding coefficients 
thought to best describe a firm's bankruptcy risk. It was found that in the year prior to 
bankruptcy Altman's derived measure was 95% accurate and was still accurate 72% of the 
time in a period up to two years prior to bankruptcy. Similar results were obtained by Altman 
when updating this research (Altman, 2000) although Grice and Ingram (200 I), do question 
this applicability when applied to a sample of their choosing. 
Ultimately, this paper seeks to achieve similar goals to the Piotroski (2000), Lopes and 
Galdi (2007), and Almas and Duque (2008), papers but in a South African context and with 
an additional filter in an attempt to improve upon discrimination. These goals include 
forming high book-to-market portfolios which contain firms that are expected to be good 
investments and then assessing and attempting to maximise the benefit thereof to an investor 
before and after removing firms exhibiting high levels of financial distress once Altman's Z-
Score is considered. Classification of a 'good investment' will be based on a firm's overall 
performance index as ascertained through use of the Piotroski F _Score which aggregates the 
information contained in an array of performance measures. 
2.2 HIGH BOOK-TO-MARKET INVESTMENT STRATEGY 
Firms with high book-to-market ratios exhibit certain unique characteristics which make 
them ideal candidates for fundamental accounting based analysis. Further, 'value' portfolios 
which comprise these firms often yield returns in excess of portfolios which are comprised 
primarily of low book-to-market firms (Fama and French, 1992, 1995). While this is 
consistent with the findings of Lakonishok et al. (1994), they also found that returns for 
book-to-market strategies are smaller for stocks of larger companies where arbitrage costs 
and investor sophistication limit the existence of mispricing. Of particular relevance to this 
paper is the study by Auret and Sinclaire (2006), conducted on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange ']SE' which shows that the book-to-market ratio is certainly associated with 
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variations in stock returns and that this coefficient is more significant than either the size 
attribute or price-to-earnings ratio. 
Fama and French (1992), postulate that, 'a high book-to-market ratio may indicate that the 
firm in question has poor prospects, signalled by low stock prices and high ratios of book-to-
market equity. As a result of this, future returns are necessarily higher than firms with strong 
prospects so as to provide adequate compensation for risk'. This theory is supported by the 
strong relationship between book-to-market, leverage, and other financial measures of risk 
observed by Fama and French (1992), and by Chen and Zhang (1998). Vassalou and Xing 
(2004), find that default risk is intimately related to the size and book-to-market 
characteristics of a firm and that this is particularly the case for the size effect which exists 
only within the top quintile of firms with the highest default risk. They find that the return 
difference between small and big firms in this quintile amounts to approximately 45 percent 
per annum. The small shares in the high-default-risk quintile tend to have the highest book-
to-market ratios and be among the smallest of the small firms. Additionally, small firms have 
much higher default risk than big firms even when considering only the high-default-risk 
quintile. It is clear that the default risk decreases consistently as size increases. This is similar 
to the result obtained for the book-to-market effect which exists only in the two quintiles with 
the highest default risk. Within this quintile, the return differential when comparing value and 
growth shares is approximately 30 percent per annum, this decreases to just 12.7 percent for 
the shares in the second highest default risk quintile. The remaining shares in the market do 
not display any book-to-market effect although the value shares in these categories do have 
the highest book-to-market ratios of all shares in the market, and the smallest size. Vassalou 
and Xing (2004), also find that high-default-risk firms earn higher returns than low-default-
risk firms but only to the extent that they are small in size and have high book-to-market 
ratios. If these characteristics are not met, they do not earn higher returns than low default 
risk firms, even if their risk of default is actually high. 
Dichev (1998) refutes this somewhat by presenting evidence that bankruptcy risk is not 
related to future returns. Indeed, Griffin and Lemmon (2002), use Ohlson's (1980), measure 
which is designed to predict the likelihood of bankruptcy (O-Score) as a proxy for distress 
risk. They show that while companies having the highest level of distress risk frequently have 
high book-to-market ratios and low past share returns as well there are in fact, somewhat 
counter intuitively, more companies in this category with low book-to-market ratios and high 
past share returns. Although both these studies do cast some doubt on the original Fama and 
French explanation for superior returns of value investing, both studies are reliant on 
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accounting models or bond market information to estimate a firm's default risk and may not 
appropriately capture the prospective risk of default given their grounding in historical 
financial information. 
An alternative proposition for the superior returns of a high book-to-market portfolio as 
compared to the returns of a low book-to-market portfolio is market mispricing rather than 
compensation for risk. Lakonishok et al. (1994), show that high book-to-market firms are 
often subject to investor and analyst 'neglect' with poor prior performance often resulting in 
highly cynical expectations for future earnings performance leading to reduced market 
valuations. Cai and Zheng (2004), and Griffin et al. (2003) show that many institutional 
investors are return momentum chasers and thereby focus on growth / glamour stocks even 
though such a strategy does not yield significant future abnormal returns. This sentiment 
explains why analysts do not recommend the selection of high book-to-market firms as an 
investment strategy and rarely provide buy / sell recommendations on these firms. In fact, 
Dechow and Sloan (1997), show that analysts themselves overestimate future prospects of 
low book-to-market firms and vice versa. LaPorta et al. (1997) and Skinner and Sloan (2002), 
illustrate this to be irrational behaviour as shown by positive earnings surprises at subsequent 
quarterly earnings announcements. Market participants underestimate future earnings for high 
book-to-market firms and overestimate future earnings for low book-to-market companies. 
More recently, Griffin and Lemmon (2002), show that companies with high distress risk 
exhibit the largest return reversals around earnings announcements. This is consistent with an 
argument for market mispricing. They also note that the book-to-market effect is largest in 
small companies with low analyst coverage. Among firms with the highest distress risk, the 
difference in returns between high and low book-to-market securities is more than twice as 
large as that in other firms. Ali, Hwang and Trombley (2003) find the book-to-market effect 
to be greater for stocks with higher idiosyncratic return volatility, higher transaction costs, 
and lower sophistication, consistent with this market-mispricing explanation. Duong et al. 
(2010), find that typical pessimistic value investors could under-react to recent good 
information but they process bad information quite rationally or even over-confidently. 
With the above in mind, value stocks are inherently more conducive to financial statement 
analysis than growth stocks. Value stocks may not have credible long-term sales and cash 
flow forecasts due to financial pressures (Koch, 2000) and little reliance can be placed on 
nonfinancial information given lack of analyst corroboration. Moreover, Asness (1997), 
shows that most of the predictability in returns for growth shares appears to be momentum 
driven but that this is not the case with value shares. Consequently, the valuation or 
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evaluation of value shares should focus on recent changes in company fundamentals. This 
would include an analysis of company liquidity, financial leverage, cash flow adequacy and 
profitability. The most appropriate way to do so is through inspection and analysis of 
historical financial statements. 
This paper, similar to the Piotroski (2000), paper, examines a refined, fundamental 
accounting based investment strategy based on a firm's book-to-market ratio where the 
benefits of financial statement analysis are investigated in an environment where historical 
financial information represents both the best and most relevant source of information about 
the firm's financial condition. 
2.3 INVESTMENT DISCRIMINATION AND THE PIOTROSKI F _SCORE 
Fama and French (1995), and Chen and Zhang (1998), were both able to show that 
financial distress is synonymous with the average high book-to-market firm. This financial 
distress could be for a number of different reasons i.e. diminishing and / or consistently low 
margins, profitability, cash flow together with liquidity and increasing and / or high levels of 
debt creating financial leverage and risk. It follows that financial signals reflecting variations 
in these financial distress indicators should prove useful in predicting future firm 
performance. 
Accordingly, Piotroski (2000), chose nine fundamental signals to measure the three key 
areas of the firm's financial condition: profitability, financial leverage / liquidity, and 
operating efficiency. The signals chosen were not identified through statistical search 
procedure but rather professional judgement and consideration of academic research. No 
representation was or is made that these signals represent the ideal set of performance 
measures for distinguishing between good and bad investments. However, it is clear from 
Piotroski's results that the composite F _score has significant statistical significance as 
regards prediction of future firm performance. In addition, all but three of the nine 
fundamental signals are significantly associated with one-year returns on an individual basis. 
Piotroski classifies each signal realisation as either 'good' or 'bad' depending on the 
signal's implication for future prices and profitability. If the signal is considered to convey 
positive news regarding future firm performance the indicator variable for the signal is equal 
to one while should the signal convey negative news regarding future performance the 
indicator variable for the signal is equal to zero. The sum of these nine binary signals or 
aggregate signal is defined as the firm's F _Score and is designed to measure the overall 
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quality, or strength, of the firm's financial position. The decision of whether or not to include 
a firm in an investment portfolio is ultimately based on the strength of this aggregate signal. 
It is important to note that whether a signal conveys positive or negative news is open to 
some degree of interpretation. Leverage for example could be a positive firm attribute 
provided the firm is financially sound and able to use this debt financing to generate returns 
in excess of the interest cost of this debt. Piotroski assumes that all firms with a high book-to-
market ratio are financially distressed and signals are considered in this context. Increased 
debt or leverage is seen as a necessity to survive and not as a means to increase returns. This 
increased debt thus comes with a corresponding increase in risk. Indeed, given the profile of 
these high book-to-market firms this seems more plausible than the alternative. Penman et al. 
(2007) provide research to support this plausible assumption by showing that the firm's book-
to-market ratio can be split in to an operational and leverage component. The operational 
component of this ratio is positively associated to subsequent returns while the leverage 
component of this book-to-market ratio is negatively associated with these returns - although 
to a lesser extent. This finding holds even when controlling for size, estimated beta, return 
volatility, momentum and default risk. 
Should these signals about future performance and the associated implications thereof not 
be uniform across the sample of high book-to-market firms, the aggregate score is likely to 
lose some ability to differentiate between strong and weak firms. 
2.3.1. Discrimination: Profitability Signals. Current profitability and quality of earnings or 
cash flow realisation are both key indicators in evaluating the firm's ability to remain 
commercially viable. Indeed, these indicators are considered to provide information about the 
firm's ability to sustain itself. Value firms typically exhibit lacklustre historic earnings 
performance and likewise struggle with cash flow generation. Accordingly, any firm able to 
generate profits or positive cash flow is demonstrating an above average ability to manage 
operations and generate some funds through these operating activities. Similarly, a trend 
towards improved efficiency through better use of firm assets is suggestive of an 
improvement in the firm's underlying ability to generate positive future cash flows. 
Piotroski (2000), uses four variables to measure these performance-related factors: ROA, 
CFO, :1ROA and ACCRUAL. Piotroski defines ROA and CFO as, 'net income before 
extraordinary items and cash flow from operations, respectively, divided by beginning-of-the-
year total assets to allow for comparability'. If the firm's ROA (CFO) is positive, Piotroski 
defines the indicator variable F _ROA (F _CFO) equal to one, zero otherwise. The indicator 
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variable !1ROA is the current year's ROA less that of the prior year. If .... ROA is positive, the 
indicator variable F _ .... ROA equals one, zero otherwise. 
The ACCRUAL variable considers the relationship between earnings and cash flow levels. 
It is defined as, 'the current year's net income before extraordinary items less cash flow from 
operations divided by beginning-of-the-year total assets'. The indicator variable 
F_ACCRUAL equals one if CFO exceeds ROA, zero otherwise. Sloan (1996), was able to 
show that positive accrual adjustments which drive earnings i.e. where profits outstrip cash 
flow from operations, is a negative signal about future profitability and returns. Piotroski 
treats, depreciation as a negative accrual. As value firms are often subject to analyst neglect 
while simultaneously suffering some form of financial distress, the incentive to actively 
manage profits through accruals in order to attract capital is likely to be substantial. 
2.3.2. Discrimination: Leverage, Liquidity and Source of Funds Signals. Of the nine 
financial signals chosen by Piotroski (2000), !1LEVER, !1UQUID and EQ_OFFER are 
designed to measure changes in capital structure and the firm's ability to service debt 
repayments as they fall due. Since most high book-to-market firms are financially distressed 
in some manner, Piotroski assumes that an increase in leverage, a deterioration of liquidity, or 
the use of external financing are all signals with negative connotations for the firm's future 
prospects. 
!1LEVER represents changes in the firm's long-term debt levels and is defined by Piotroski 
as 'the historical change in the ratio of total long-term debt to average total assets. An 
increase (decrease) in financial leverage is a negative (positive) signal'. By raising external 
capital, Piotroski believes, and is supported by research by Myers and Majluf (1984), that a 
financially distressed firm is signalling its inability to generate sufficient internal funds. 
Further, this additional long-term debt will likely restrict the firm's ongoing financial 
flexibility. The indicator variable F_!1LEVER is equal to one (zero) if the firm's long-term 
debt to average total assets fell (rose) in the year immediately prior to portfolio formation. 
The variable .... UQUID attempts to capture the change in the firm's prior and current year 
current ratio. Piotroski defines the current ratio as, 'the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities excluding short-term debt at fiscal year-end'. Piotroski assumes that an 
improvement in liquidity, where !1UQUID is greater than zero, is a positive signal which 
indicates that the firm is able to meet current debt obligations. The indicator variable 
F _!1UQUID equals one if the firm's liquidity improved, zero otherwise. 
Finally, Piotroski defines the indicator variable EQ_OFFER as, 'equal to one if the 
company did not issue ordinary shares in the year immediately prior to portfolio formation, 
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zero otherwise'. This logic is similar to that applied for an increase in long-term debt, raising 
of external capital by financially distressed companies could be a signal of inability to 
generate sufficient internal funds to meet future obligations. A further indicator of the 
unfortunate financial condition facing these firms is the willingness to issue equity when the 
share price is likely depressed due to financial distress. This will have the effect of inflating 
the company's cost of capital. 
2.3.3. Discrimination: Operating Efficiency Signals. The remaining two signals are 
designed to measure changes in the efficiency of the firm's operations: i1MARGIN and 
i1TURN. These ratios are of key importance as they directly reflect the operational 
characteristics of the business i.e. how well assets are used to generate returns and how these 
returns are maintained after allowing for running costs of the business. 
Piotroski defines ;).MARGIN as, 'the firm's current gross margin ratio (gross margin 
divided by total sales) less the prior year's gross margin ratio'. An improvement in margins 
signifies a reduction in raw material and input costs, an increase in the price of a company's 
product or both. The indicator variable F _;).MARGIN equals one if ;).MARGIN is positive, 
zero otherwise. 
Piotroski defines i1TURN as, 'the firm's current year asset turnover ratio (total sales 
divided by beginning-of-the-year total assets) less the prior year's asset turnover ratio'. An 
improvement in this ratio provides an indication that assets have been utilised more 
productively. This improvement could come about as a result of an increase in sales or simply 
more efficient operations where progressively fewer assets generate a consistent level of 
sales. This variable may also capture a general improvement in market conditions and 
demand for the company's products. The indicator variable F_i1TURN equals one if i1TURN 
is positive, zero otherwise. 
As mentioned previously, several of the signals used in Piotroski's paper bear some 
resemblance to the constructs tested in Lev and Thiagarajan (1993), and Abarbanell and 
Bushee (1997; 1998). Indeed, prior academic research has influenced the signals included in 
Piotroski's analysis but without realising similar success. Several reasons exist for this 
difference. First, Piotroski examines smaller firms which are assumed to be more financially 
distressed than is the norm. Variables were chosen to measure profitability and default risk 
trends relevant for these companies. Primary signals that are responsible for knock-on effects 
such as LIFO/FIFO inventory choices, capital expenditure decisions, effective tax rates, and 
qualified audit opinions are used to capture changes in the overall health of these companies. 
The source of each company's financial health or distress is sought as opposed to simply 
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seeking the symptoms. An example of this is that most of these high book-to-market 
companies are subject to capital constraints or rationing. Consequently, Lev and 
Thiagarajan's capital expenditure variable does not show much cross-sectional variation in 
Piotroski's study. Piotroski also believes that the majority of these high book-to-market 
companies will probably have assessed tax losses to carry forward against which to offset 
future taxable income (due to poor historical performance), this also limits the information 
content of Lev and Thiagarajan's effective tax rate variable. Second, the work of Bernard 
(1994), and Sloan (1996), shows how crucial cash flows, accounting returns and the 
relationship between each of these is when attempting to establish the future performance 
potential of a company. It is for this reason that variables capturing these signals are 
considered to be vital to the current analysis. Finally, it is also important to note that neither 
Lev and Thiagarajan (1993), nor Abarbanell and Bushee (1997, 1998), claim to possesses an 
optimal set of fundamental financial signals. By using different signals (some of which 
represent similar attributes of a company's financial performance to those relied upon by Lev 
and Thiagarajan and Abarbanell and Bushee) to great effect simply serves to demonstrate the 
robustness of a considered financial statement analysis technique. 
2.3.4. Discrimination: Combined Score. As indicated earlier, Piotroski defines F _SCORE 
as 'the sum of the individual binary signals or, F_SCORE = F_ROA + Fj .... ROA + F_CFO + 
F_ACCRUAL + Fj .... MARGIN + Fj.,.TURN + Fj .... LEVER + Fj .... LIQUID + EQ_OFFER'. 
As there are nine underlying signals, an F _SCORE can be as low as 0 and as high as 9. A low 
(high) F _SCORE is considered to indicate a company with very few (mostly) good signals. 
Piotroski expects an F _SCORE to be positively associated with changes in future company 
performance and share returns although this is reliant on the extent to which current 
fundamentals predict future fundamentals. Piotroski' s investment technique is to select 
companies with a high F _SCORE, being the combination of the nine underlying signals 
rather than anyone particular signal. This approach represents one simple application of 
fundamental analysis for identifying strong and weak value firms. In comparison to the work 
of Ou and Penman (1989), and Holthausen and Larcker (1992), Piotroski (2000), sought to be 
more pragmatic with his analysis. It is not necessary to estimate probability models and the 
data does not need to be fitted on an annual basis to implement this strategy. 
Piotroski believed there to be two issues with his approach. First, 'the translation of the 
factors into binary signals, while being simple and easy to implement, could potentially 
eliminate useful information'. To address this issue Piotroski included an alternative 
methodology in his paper where each of the nine factors was annually ranked and summed 
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after being turned in to a continuous representation and aggregated with little to no 
improvement being noted. 
Second, given a lack of theoretical justification for the combined use of the nine variables 
identified, Piotroski acknowledged that the methodology employed in his paper could be 
perceived as 'ad hoc'. He believed that any variable that was effective in assessing the 
financial health of a firm at the time of portfolio formation would suffice - to varying degrees 
- as the goal of the methodology is merely to separate strong value firms from weak value 
firms. Piotroski investigates several alternative measures to investigate this belief. In 
particular, he partitioned his high book-to-market portfolio by level of financial distress 
(according to each company's Altman Z-Score), historical change in profitability represented 
by MOA and further, a decomposition of this measure in to a gross margin and asset 
turnover component. Results of this further partitioning lent credence to the use of various 
fundamental analysis techniques for identifying strong and weak firms while also showing 
the benefit of using multiple items of historical financial information to form an opinion with 
respect to a company's future performance. 
2.3.5. Discrimination: Altman Z-Score. 
All iterations of the Piotroski model will include an additional screen for financial distress. 
Theoretically Piotroski's signals and the combination thereof should intrinsically establish a 
firm's likelihood of financial distress through calculation of the composite F _Score which is 
intended to indicate the financial health, or lack thereof, of the firm. However, the Altman Z-
Score (Altman, 1968), was specifically developed for this purpose and is widely accepted as 
an appropriate tool having seen much practical application by investment analysts. The Z-
Score provides an indication of a firm's risk of financial distress through use of a 
discriminant function comprised of five financial ratios with different weightings allocated to 
each. Altman's Z-Score was found to have an accuracy rate for classifying financially 
distressed firms of 95% when using data one financial statement prior to bankruptcy and 72% 
when using data from two years prior to bankruptcy. In more recent updates of this study, the 
success of this Z-Score at predicting financially distressed firms was consistently between 80 
- 90% based on data from one financial reporting period prior to bankruptcy (Altman, 2000). 
The majority of financial ratios chosen do differ from those included in the Piotroski F _Score 
and may well yield additional benefit despite concerns raised by Grice and Ingram (2001), as 
to the reported accuracy of the model and present day applicability. 
3. Data and methodology 
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3.1 SAMPLE SELECTION 
All firms listed on the JSE between 2005 and 20 I 0 were selected to form the initial 
population to be subjected to further analysis. Income statement, balance sheet and cash flow 
data for each firm was obtained from BFA McGregor using the 'Prelim Balance Sheet', 
'Prelim Income Statement' and 'Prelim Cash flow' templates. Dividend yield, share price and 
market return history together with financial year end date per annum were obtained from 
Datastream. To ensure that the full six years of data could be analysed using the Piotroski 
methodology, it was necessary to supplement certain balance sheet and income statement 
information with additional detail for years 2002, 2003 and 2004. As the BFA McGregor 
dataset did not provide any data for periods prior to 2004 this information was obtained from 
the Standard Bank online share trading platform on a company by company basis. 
Once the above information was obtained, the nine Piotroski variables and five Altman 
variables were calculated on an annual basis for each company. It is important to note that the 
supplementary balance sheet and income statement information was required to enable the 
calculation of the F j .... TURN and F j1LEVER indicator variables for 2004 and 2005 - both of 
which require information from two years prior to portfolio formation. Without obtaining this 
additional information the first two years of sample data obtained from BFA McGregor 
would have been used solely for calculation of later year F _Scores and would not have been 
available for analysis thereby severely reducing the eventual sample. 
In addition, certain adaptations were necessary to expand the available data points beyond 
that which a strict application of Piotroski's methodology might allow. It appears to be quite 
common for South African firms not to disclose cost of sales or a gross margin and thus it 
was frequently not possible to calculate the F j .... MARGIN indicator variable. In these 
instances, .:IN ETMARGIN has instead been used and is defined as the firm's current net 
margin ratio (net margin divided by total sales) less the prior year's net margin ratio. When 
assessing the operating efficiency of a firm .:JNETMARGIN is likely to be as valuable as 
considering only the improvement or deterioration of the annual gross margin (!'I. MARGIN). 
The ability to control, and improve upon, ancillary operational costs i.e. costs other than those 
directly related to the manufacturing of a product or delivery of a service, can be as much a 
sign of good business acumen and management as a positive gross margin or improvement 
therein. Attention to detail below the gross margin line item further indicates a holistic 
approach to operational excellence. The indicator variable F _!'I.MARGIN equals one if 
.'1NETMARGIN is positive, zero otherwise. Likewise, if no interest bearing debt line item was 
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separately disclosed F _t>,LEVER could not be calculated and non-current liabilities were 
substituted as a proxy for this change in capital structure. 
After obtaining as many credible data points per indicator variable per company per year 
as possible the market value of equity and book-to-market ratio were calculated using 
financial year end net assets values and market capitalisation figures. The market value of 
equity and book-to-market ratio are used to create consistency between the book-to-market 
ratio used for portfolio assignments and the ratio used to determine book-to-market and size 
cut-offs. All firms with sufficient data to calculate a book-to-market ratio are ranked at each 
financial year end to identify book-to-market quintile and size tercile cut-offs. As each firm's 
book-to-market ratio is calculated at a different point in time, being the firm specific financial 
year-end date, observations are grouped by and ranked within financial report years. This 
means that all observations for the financial year ended 2004 are grouped regardless of the 
month which denotes year end within the 2004 year. This grouping is then used to determine 
the financial year 2004 size and book-to-market cutoffs. After the book-to-market quintiles 
are formed, only the firms in the highest book-to-market quintile with sufficient financial 
statement data to calculate various performance measurement signals are retained. This 
approach yields the final sample of 346 high book-to-market firm data points across the six 
years (refer Appendix A). 
3.2 CALCULA nON OF RETURNS 
Returns are measured as 12- or 24-month buy-and-hold returns. Measurement of these returns 
commences from the beginning of the fifth month after the firm's financial year-end to ensure 
complete information dissemination at the time of investing. The average dividend yield over 
this period has been included on a share by share basis within the calculation of this return to 
allow for accurate comparison with a total return index of the market. If a firm delists, the 
effect of this will be neither positive nor negative as the buy-and-hold return will be excluded 
from the population of returns due to lack of a data point at the end of the 'hold' period. 
When calculation a market-adjusted return, this is obtained by subtracting the value-weighted 
market return from the buy-and-hold return over the corresponding time period. 
In all cases, an attempt has been made to ensure that survivorship bias has not materially 
impacted upon the outcome of this paper. All JSE listed companies for each of the six years 
under review have been compiled in to a single complete listing and financial data has been 
obtained wherever possible for each of these companies for each financial year to ensure 
delisted companies are certainly taken in to account. Gilbert and Strugnell (2010). were able 
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to demonstrate that survivorship bias is an important factor to consider when analysing data 
from the JSE. This bias was clearly demonstrated in the difference of returns between the 
complete and listed group of firms where the mean levels of returns were higher for the listed 
group of firms (i.e. after certain firms have delisted) than those generated for the complete 
data set. This is as to be expected if the characteristics of the delisted firms are systematically 
different from those of the listed firms at each point in time. 
3.3 RESULTS 
The primary methodology of this paper is identical to that established by Piotroski (2000), 
but with application in a South African specific context. That is, to form portfolios based on 
the firm's nine combined signals where possible, represented by the firm's F_SCORE. Firms 
having the least positive signals (being equal to 0 or lout of at least 6 Piotroski variables) are 
categorised as 'Low F _SCORE' firms and these firms are expected to underperform both 
'High F_SCORE' firms and the population from which they were taken. Firms having the 
most positive signals are categorised as 'High F _SCORE' firms and these firms are expected 
to outperform both 'Low F _SCORE' firms and the population from which they were taken. 
Given the consistency and strength of these fundamental signals, these firms are expected to 
have the best subsequent return performance. A high F _SCORE firm is defined as having 0 or 
I Piotroski variables below the total number of Piotroski variables it has been possible to 
calculate provided that at least six Piotroski variables are available for the analysis. A high 
F _SCORE firm could thus have 5 or 6 positive Piotroski variables out of 6, 6 or 7 positive 
Piotroski variables out of 7 or 8 or 9 positive Piotroski variables out of 9. 
It has been necessary to adapt the selection criteria used by Piotroski for low and high 
F _SCORE firms due to a substantial number of unavailable data points which might 
otherwise have reduced the final sample of firms below that which is already a limited 
number - especially when compared to Piotroski's sample of 14,043. Classifying a firm as 
having a low F _SCORE regardless of the number of Piotroski variables available might make 
an inappropriate assumption based on insufficient information. Classifying a firm as having a 
high F _SCORE should be robust provided it is possible to calculate at least two-thirds of 
Piotroski's variables and permit at most one negative signal within this calculation. 
The tests in this paper are designed to examine whether the high F _SCORE portfolio 
outperforms other portfolios constructed from the same sample of firms but using different 
selection criteria. These tests will be conducted against three separate samples. The first will 
attempt to remain faithful to Piotroski's methodology and select only the top 20% of high 
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book-to-market firms in each financial year, the second seeks to employ the book-to-market 
ratio as cut-off for the selection of a high book-to-market sample. Any firm having a book-to-
market ratio equal to or exceeding I is considered to be a high book-to-market firm by virtue 
of the firm's net asset value being equal to or exceeding its share price. It is interesting to 
note that this method of sample selection allows for the consideration of a greater proportion 
of firms in years of economic strife when share prices are depressed and fewer firms when 
the market is booming. This is consistent with value investor findings. The final sample is 
comprised of the market as a whole and seeks to address the question as to whether or not 
there is value to be had in picking financially sound firms using Piotroski's F _SCORE with 
little regard for book-to-market ratios, firm size etc. 
In each case, two primary tests are conducted. The first test compares the returns earned by 
high F _SCORE firms against the returns of low F _SCORE firms; the second test compares 
high F _SCORE firms against the complete portfolio of firms included in the selected sample. 
These results are then further analysed with the use of additional partitions. 
4, EMPIRICAL RESULTS: 
4.1 PIOTROSKI HIGH BOOK-TO-MARKET FIRMS EMPIRICAL ATTRIBUTES 
Table I provides financial and return characteristics of high book-to-market firms included 
in the Piotroski high book-to-market portfolio of firms. Firms in the upper quintile of book-
to-market ratios are selected from each financial year between 2005 and 2010. As can be seen 
in panel A, the average firm within this portfolio has a book-to-market ratio of 1.9226 while 
the median book-to-market ratio is 1.7144. Consistent with prior research findings (Fama and 
French, 1995), high book-to-market firms show evidence of poor performance. The majority 
of high book-to-market firms show an increase in leverage and reduction in turnover, cash 
generating ability, margins and ROA. A majority of high book-to-market firms also show 
manipulation of returns through annually increasing positive accruals where profits outstrip 
cash flow from operations. Despite this, almost all ratios have a positive mean and in most 
cases this positive mean is fairly substantial which would indicate that, although in the 
minority, there are high book-to-market firms with sound underlying financial characteristics 
that outweigh the poor characteristics evidenced by the majority. These findings are not 
dissimilar to those of Piotroski although it is interesting to note that Piotroski' s high book -to-
market firms had primarily negative, albeit negligibly so, means for each financial 
characteristic. It would appear that although the proportion of firms with positive signals is 
incredibly similar in both South Africa and Piotroski's sample of US firms, South African 
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TABLE! 
Financial and Return Characteristics of High Book-to-Market Firms 
Panel A: Financial Characteristics 
Standard Proportion with 
Variable Mean Median Deviation Positive Signal 
MVE" 1171.4244 147.5965 3781.5707 N/A 
ASSETS" 5644.2209 497.7175 28010.5866 N/A 
BM' 1.9226 1.7144 1.1256 N/A 
ROA d 2.0120 0.0467 27.7788 0.7410 
~ROA" 1.3348 -0.0011 29.3732 0.4737 
~MARGINI 
-0.0250 -0.0028 2.8025 0.4727 
CFO g 0.5067 0.0318 7.5802 0.6787 
~L1QUlDh 0.0280 -0.0369 9.3050 0.4504 
~LEVER' 0.1279 0.0008 0.4542 0.5099 
~ TURN! 2.3335 -0.0041 100.3961 0.4164 
ACCRUAL I. 
-1.5081 -0.0088 27.6326 0.4518 
Panel B: Buy-and-Hold Returns from a High Book-to-Market Investment Strategy 
Proportion with 
Returns I Mean Median Positive Signal 
Onc-Year Returns 
Raw 0.3226 0.0426 0.5286 
Market-Adjusted 0.1634 -0.0861 0.4086 
Two- Y ear Retum~ 
Raw 0.6817 0.0523 0.5213 
Market-Adju~ted 0.3810 -0.1849 0.3958 
"MVE = Financial year end (/) market value of equity calculated as the closing share price times the number of shares 
outqanding at the financial year-end. This could also be defined as market capitalistion. 
"ASSETS = Financial year end (t) total assets. 
'BM = Financial yearend (t) book value ofequity divided by MV£. 
"ROA = Financial year net income divided by total assets at the beginning of year /. 
'\ROA = Annual change in ROA being ROA of year t less ROA of year /·1. 
'\MARCIN = Annual change in grms margin being the gross Imrgin of year / less gross margin of year /·1. 
gCFO = Cash flow from operations divided by total assets at the beginning of year /. 
h "LIQUID = Annual change in current ratio being current assets to current liabilities of year / less current assets less current 
liabilities of year /-1. 
',\ LEVER = Annual change in totallong-tenn debt (including any portion thereof classified as current) of }car / and /·1. divided 
by avemge total asseb over these periods. 
J" TURN = Annual change in asset tumover being net sales divided by average total assets for years / less /-1 . 
'ACCRUAL = Financial year net income less cash flow from operations and divided by total assets at the beginning of year / . 
'One-Year (Two- Year) Raw Retum is calculated as a 12- (24-) month buy-and-hold return starting at at the beginning of the fifth 
month atier financial year-end. Market-Adjusted Return is b calculated as the Raw Return less the corresponding buy-and-hold 
return of the \ alue-weighted market index over the same period. 
high book-la-market, financially strong firms are in fact more financially robust sound than 
their US counterparts. 
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Panel B illustrates 12- and 24-month buy-and-hold returns for the complete Piotroski 
sample of high book-to-market firms along with the percentage of high book-to-market firms 
earning positive raw and market-adjusted returns in each of the respective periods. As is to be 
expected, panel B clearly shows that a portfolio comprised of high book to market firms does 
earn positive market-adjusted returns in the period following portfolio formation. This is 
consistent with the research conducted by Fama and French (1992), Lakonishok et al. (1994), 
and Auret and Sinclair (2006). Of particular interest is that, despite the incredibly strong 
mean performance of this portfolio, approximately 60% of these firms earn negative market-
adjusted returns and thus, eliminating these underperforming firms which form the majority 
of a high book-to-market portfolio will inevitably improve the portfolio's mean return 
performance. In theory, these underperforming firms should be characterised by weak 
financial performance signals and should be the culprits for the net negative median 
performance signals in table A. 
4.2 PIOTROSKI F _SCORE STRATEGY RETURNS - INITIAL PIOTROSKI SAMPLE 
Spearman correlations between each individual Piotroski variable, one- and two- year 
returns, one- and two- year market-adjusted returns and the combined F _SCORE are 
presented in Table 2. Returns are not as strongly correlated with F _SCORE as was evidenced 
in Piotroski' s paper although over a 12-month period a similar result was noted i.e. 
F _SCORE has the highest correlation with returns and particularly market-adjusted returns. 
For a 24-month period both the change in leverage of a firm and issue of equity in the year 
prior to portfolio formation have higher correlations with returns than seen in the F _SCORE. 
Thus, for a 12-month investment strategy use of the Piotroski F _SCORE is likely to 
outperform a strategy with fewer considerations but use of the Piotroski F _SCORE as part of 
a 24-month investment strategy may not prove to be of most benefit. 
Table 3 shows the returns available to a high book-to-market investor making use of 
Piotroski's F _SCORE. Panel A provides raw return distributions for a 12-month buy-and-
hold investment strategy, Panel B provides market-adjusted return distributions over this 
same period and Panel C provides market adjusted return distributions for a 24-month buy-
and-hold investment strategy. For succinctness, only market-adjusted returns will be 
discussed and further analysis will focus on the 12-month period within this category. 
As is to be expected, and similar to Piotroski's findings, most firms (91 %) are 
unexceptional performers having an F _SCORE above 2 but insufficient positive variables to 
be classified as having a high F _SCORE either. These firms are considered to have 
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conflicting performance signals and no attempt is made to ascertain further details regarding 
return performance and share characteristics. Approximately 6o/c of firms within the 
population are considered to have high F _SCORES and thus be financially sound and 3% 
have low F _SCORES and are thus considered to be in a precarious financial position. 
Piotroski had a similar proportion of low F _SCORE firms within his popUlation but a 66% 
greater proportion of high F _SCORE firms. This fundamentally different proportion of high 
F _SCORE firms to both the portfolio of high book-to-market firms and low F _SCORE firms 
will likely have an impact on subsequent analysis as these two extreme portfolios are the 
basis upon which this method of fundamental analysis has been tested. 
Perhaps the most striking data presented in table 3 is the fairly consistent positive 
relationship between F _SCORE and subsequent returns. As mentioned previously, there 
appears to be some uncertainty with respect to firm wellbeing and return performance in the 
middle of the F _SCORE range but it is clear that higher F _SCORE firms tend to have 
positive market adjusted returns and lower F_SCORE firms tend to have negative market-
adjusted returns. This holds true for both 12- and 24- month return distributions. This 
relationship is in turn mirrored in the mean return of both the high and low F _SCORE 
portfolios. In all instances high book-to-market firms having a high F _SCORE substantially 
outperform low F _SCORE counterparts. Unfortunately this relationship, while clearly 
observable, is not statistically significant. This is likely a result of the variability in the 
underlying return distribution of both high and low F _SCORE firms and a limitation imposed 
by the relatively small dataset of 346 firms for the one-year return portfolios and 279 for the 
two-year return portfolios. 
Of particular concern is the fact that high F _SCORE firms appear to underperform the 
portfolio of high book-to-market firms in the short run although it should be noted that even 
though this is the case, these high F _SCORE firms do still outperform the market as a whole 
and appear to compensate for lack-lustre performance when held over a 24-month period. 
Once again, the relationship of high F _SCORE firms to all firms in the high book-to-market 
portfolio is not statistically significant. It is for this reason i.e. the overt lack of statistical 
significance. that additional non-parametric bootstrapping techniques have not been included 
in this analysis. Any such techniques cannot hope to change such a clearly statistical 
insignificant outcome. 
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RETURN 
RETURN2 
MA_RET 
MA_RET2 
ROA 
L'1ROA 
L'1MARGIN 
CFO 
L'1L1QUID 
L'1LEVER 
L'1TURN 
ACCRUAL 
EQ_OFFER 
TABLE 2 
Speamwl! Correlation Ana~vsis hetween Olle- and Two-Year Market-Adjusted Retllms, the Nine Fundamental Signals, and 
the Composite Signal (F _SCORE)jor High Book-to-Market Firms a 
ROA ~OA M1ARGIN CFO &IQUID &EVER L'1TURN ACCRUAL EQ OFFER 
-0.020 -0.016 -0.003 -0.016 0.050 0.053 -0.007 0.016 O'{)89 
-0.025 -0.019 0.001 -0.015 0.012 0.151 -0.007 0.021 0.127 
-0.008 -0.005 0.000 -0.010 0.051 0.016 -0.005 0.005 0.084 
-0.017 -0.010 0.013 -0.009 0.010 0.105 -0.004 0.015 0.120 
I .000 0.965 -0.004 0.155 0.002 0.037 0.240 -0.963 0.053 
I .000 -0.003 0.152 -0.007 0.044 0.349 -0.928 0.058 
1.000 -0.006 0.048 -0.070 -0.009 0.003 0.049 
1.000 0.013 -0.020 0.686 0.117 -0.051 
1.000 -0.023 0.010 0.001 0.024 
1.000 -0.011 -0.041 0.178 
1.000 -0.053 0.005 
1.000 -0.067 
1.000 
F SCORE 
0.101 
0.071 
0.107 
0.079 
0.431 
0.536 
0.553 
0.462 
0.388 
0.220 
0.422 
0.175 
0.295 
"One-year returns (REf URN) and two-year returns (REfURN2) are measured as the huy-and-hold returns starting in the fifth month after financial year-end. One-year market-
adjusted returns (MA_RbT) and two-year market-adjusted returns (MA_RbT2) are n~asured as the buy-and-hold returns st,nting in the tifth month aftertinalH:ial year-cnd less 
the c()JTesponding value-weighted market retull1 over the holding period. All raw variahles underlying the hinalY signals arc as defined in tahle I. The nine individual factors in 
this table rcpresent indicator variahles equal to one (zero) if the underlying pcrtilnn.lIlce n~asurc was a good (had) signal about future tirm pertilnmncc. The prdix ("f _") for the 
nine fllndan~ntal signals was eliminated fi)l'succinctness. 
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TABLE 3 
Buy-alld-Hold Returns to a Value Investment Strategy Based on Fundamcntal Signals 
This tahle presents huy-and-hold retum~ associated with each of the ten possihle outcomes for the Piotroski F _SCORE. F _SCORE i~ equal to the sum of nine 
individual signab, or F_SCORE = F_ROA + F_MOA + F_CFO + F_ACCRUAL + F_MtARGIN + F_/l.TURN + F_fl.LEVER + F_fl.LIQUID + 
EQ_OFFER, where each hinary signal equab one Vero) if the underlying reali~ation is a good (bad) signal ahout future flfm perfomlance. A Low f,--SCORE 
(equal to I'ero) n~ans the fnTIl possesses the least favorable set of fmancial signab and vice versa. The Low F _SCORE p0l1f()lio consi"ts of firm" with an 
aggregate score of 0 or I out of a minimum of 6 Piotroski variahles, the High F _Score pOl1folio consists of finn; with a score of 5 or 6 out of a total of 6 
Piotroski variables. 6 or 7 out of a total of7 Piotroski variahles. 7 or 8 out of a total of 8 Piotroski variahles or 8 or 9 out of a total of 9 Piotroski variahles. 
Panel A: One-Year Raw Retums - Cumulative by PercentiIe 3 
Proportion with 
Mean 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% Positive Signal n 
High Book-to-Market fnm~ 0.3226 -0.6478 -0.4879 -0.2833 -0.1206 -0.0010 0.5289 346 
F_SCORE 
o (L) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
I (L) 0.0663 -0.0079 -0.1144 -0.1672 -0.1910 -0.1912 0.4000 10 
2 0.1060 -0.6721 -0.4856 -0.2635 -0.1219 0.0099 0.5806 31 
3 0.1322 -0.5729 -0.4313 -0.2600 -0.1063 -0.0068 0.4655 58 
4 0.0276 -0.6661 -0.5192 -0.3153 -0.1701 -0.0524 0.4615 65 
5 0.1599 -0.6584 -0.4737 -0.2689 -0.1007 0.0160 0.5663 83 
6 out of6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
6 out of7 (H) -0.0531 0.0000 -0.4934 -0.2047 -0.0531 -0.0531 0.6667 3 
6 out of8b 11.0476 0.0000 -0.8571 -0.4286 11.0476 11.0476 0.3333 3 
6 out of9 0.2728 -0.5251 -0.4125 -0.2428 -0.0668 0.0855 0.5000 52 
7 out of7 (H) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
7 out ofS (H) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
7 out of9b 1.4154 -0.4242 -0.1990 -0.0555 0.1062 0.2373 0.7826 23 
8 out of8 (H) 1.1000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.1000 I. 1000 0.5000 2 
8 out of9 (H) 0.2186 -0.5509 -0.2821 -0.1277 -0.0103 0.1313 0.7273 II 
9 out of9 (H) 0.1347 0.0000 -0.6000 -0.4316 -0.3682 -0.3317 0.2000 5 
Low F _Score (L) 0.0663 -0.0079 -0.1144 -0.1672 -0.1910 -0.1912 0.4000 10 
High F Score (H) 0.2437 -0.6009 -0.4917 -0.2949 -0.1277 -0.0096 0.5714 21 
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High less All -0.0789 OJ)469 -0.0038 -0.0115 -0.0070 -(l.0086 0.0425 
High less Low 0.1774 -0.5930 -0.3773 -0.1276 0.0634 0.1816 0.1714 
t -Stati~tic (High less All) 0.3748 
I -Stati~tic (High less Low) 0.5467 
Panel B: One-Year Market-Adjusted Returns < 
Proportion with 
Mean 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% Positive Signal II 
All FiJnlS 0.1634 -0.7849 -0.6133 -0.4178 -0.2625 -0.1483 0.4075 346 
F_SCORE 
o (L) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
1 (L) -0.1453 -0.2143 -0.3046 -0.3420 -0.3569 -0.3561 0.4000 10 
2 -0.0391 -0.7823 -0.5973 -0.4131 -0.2648 -0.1241 0.3871 31 
3 -0.0659 -0.7492 -0.6249 -0.4628 -0.2990 -0.2069 0.3793 58 
4 -0.1063 -0.7426 -0.6113 -0.4277 -0.2870 -0.1829 0.3538 65 
5 0.0252 -0.7679 -0.5678 -0.3718 -0.2154 -0.1155 0.4458 83 
6 out of6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
6 out of7 (H) -0.1158 0.0000 -0.2332 -0.1506 -0.1158 -0.1158 0.0000 3 
6 out of8 11.0067 0.0000 -0.8472 -0.2935 11.0067 11.0067 0.6667 3 
6 out of9 0.1052 -0.6782 -0.4986 -0.3417 -0.2024 -0.0677 0.4231 52 
7 out of7 (H) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
7 out of8 (H) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
7 out of9 1.257lJ -0.7027 -0.4606 -0.2310 -0.0461 0.0lJ21 0.5652 23 
8 out of8 (H) 1.033lJ 0.0000 0.0000 -0.234lJ 1.0339 1.0339 0.5000 2 
8 out of9 (H) -0.0472 -0.5698 -0.4193 -0.3353 -0.2501 -0.1209 0.3636 11 
9 out of9 (H) 0.0877 0.0000 -0.6979 -0.5680 -0.4558 -0.3530 0.2000 5 
Low F _Score (L) -0.1453 -0.2143 -0.3046 -0.3420 -0.3569 -0.3561 0.4000 10 
High F Score (H) 0.0781 -0.7576 -0.5103 -0.3714 -0.2691 -O.I77lJ 0.2857 21 
High less All -0.0853 0.0273 0.1030 0.0464 -0'()066 -0.0297 -0.1218 
High less Low 0.2233 -0.5433 -0.2057 -0.0294 0.0878 0.1782 -0.1143 
I -Statistic (High less All) 0.4258 
t -Stati~tic (High less Low) 0.6764 
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Panel C: Two-Year Market-Adjusted Returns b 
Proportion with 
Mean 10% 25% 50% 75% 90clc Positive Signal /l 
AlIFirm~ 0.3810 -1.1232 -0.8758 -0.6379 -OAI07 -0.2555 0.3978 279 
F_SCORE 
o (L) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
I (L) -0.4466 -1.4836 -1.2532 -1.0288 -0.6595 -0.6585 0.3750 8 
2 -0.0977 0.2214 -0.4174 -0.5369 -0.3517 -0.1940 OA074 27 
3 -0.1285 -1.1253 -0.9438 -0.5473 -0.4315 -0.1684 OA082 49 
4 -0.1816 -0.9956 -0.8459 -0.6575 -0.4708 -0.3343 0.3019 53 
5 1.1897 -1.1309 -0.8313 -0.6016 -0.3787 -0.2166 0.3871 62 
6 out of6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
6 out of7 (H) 3.3050 0.0000 -0.4758 -0.2126 3.3050 3.3050 0.6667 3 
6 out of8 1.0954 0.0000 -0.4329 -0.1675 1.0954 1.0954 0.6667 3 
6 out of9 0.3594 -0.9356 -0.7288 -0.5671 -0.3494 -0.2233 0.3571 42 
7 out of7 (H) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
7 out of8 (H) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
7 out of9 1.3259 -0.7773 -0.5967 -0.3494 -0.0776 0.0898 0.5556 18 
8 out of8 (H) 0.0764 0.0000 0.0000 0.0338 0.0764 0.0764 I.DOOO 2 
8 out of9 (H) 0.0933 -0.8010 -0.7259 -0.3293 -0.0025 0.0933 0.5556 9 
9 out of9 (H) -().3192 0.0000 -0.9832 -0.5852 -0.5852 -0.3192 0.3333 3 
Low F _Score (L) -0.4466 -1.4836 -1.2532 -1.0288 -0.6595 -0.6585 0.3750 8 
High F Score (H) 0.5853 -0.8921 -0.7277 -0.4284 -0.1922 -0.0833 0.5882 17 
High less All 0.2043 0.2311 0.1481 0.2095 0.2185 0.1722 0.1904 
High less Low 1.0319 0.5915 0.5256 0.6004 0.4673 0.5752 0.2132 
t -Statistic (High less All) 0.3187 
t -Stati~tic (High less Low) 1.4777 
"Raw retulTIs are calculated as 12- and 24- month buy-and-hold retums starting at the beginning of the tifth month alier tinancial year-end. 
hThc unusual m~ans for6out of X and 7 out of9 Piotroski variables arc due to two individual shares i.e. ePN and SYR respectively. Due to equal weighting in each of their respective 
Piotroski f' _Score portfolios and their significant share price growth. portfolio means for these two Piotroski f' _Score portfolios have been skewed. 
C Market ajdusted retums are calculated as 12- and 24-rnonth buy-and-hold retulTIs starting at the beginning of the fifth month after financial year-end less the buy-and-hold retuITI on 
the market index over this same investment horizon. 
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This lack of statistical significance over a 12-month period does in fact make sense as 
further analysis of these returns does show that the high F _SCORE portfolio has not shifted 
the return distribution in a positive direction but simply resulted in a greater spread with a 
greater net positive result. In fact, there are relatively fewer high F _SCORE firms with 
positive returns than there are low F _SCORE firms with positive returns which is in itself 
quite concerning. 
Clear observable benefit is only evident when analysing 24-month returns. In this case the 
entire return distribution is shifted in a favourable manner when investing in high F _SCORE 
firms and the result is that these high F _SCORE firms outperform both the entire high book-
to-market portfolio and low F _SCORE portfolio by quite some margin. 
Overall, it is possible to surmise that F _SCORE can pick firms with poor future return 
performance and that both the market and high F _SCORE portfolio will substantially 
outperform these firms. It is at this stage unclear as to whether F _SCORE can pick firms with 
superior future returns over and above those returns realised by a portfolio of high book-to-
market firms. If F _SCORE were able to achieve this goal in a South African context it would 
likely only be possible over a longer investment horizon where high F _SCORE firms 
demonstrate returns well in excess of the market-at-Iarge, a high book-to-market portfolio 
and low F _SCORE firms. It would also appear that this methodology can be applied to the 
South African market although with less statistically significant and credible outcomes than 
have been obtained elsewhere and with some effort required to ensure as large a dataset as 
possible and appropriate data integrity. 
4.3 RETURNS CONDITIONAL ON FIRM SIZE, FINANCIAL DISTRESS OR 
HISTORICAL CHANGE IN PROFITABILITY - INITIAL PIOTROSKI SAMPLE 
A key question is whether further partitioning of data will indicate areas in which 
Piotroski's methodology and sample selection criteria can yield statistically significant or 
simply improved results. In particular, further allocation in to firm size, level of financial 
distress and historical change in profitability is considered. In the case of firm size firms are 
classified in to upper, middle and lower tercile groups within the total population. Size 
allocation is based on the market capitalisation of each of the individual firms at year-end. 
The historical change in profitability is as calculated for use in Piotroski's t>..ROA variable and 
firms within the selected sample are allocated to either a high, moderate or low t>..ROA group. 
MOA had the strongest correlation to F _SCORE in table 2 thus the high :'1ROA partition 
should consist primarily of high F _SCORE firms. Financial distress is determined with 
reference to each firm's specific Z-Score as calculated in accordance with Altman's seminal 
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paper. A Z-Score in excess of 2.99 is considered to indicate a firm that is financially sound 
while a Z-Score below 1.81 is considered to indicate a firm in financial distress. Tables 4 and 
5 present the various outcomes of these further partitions. 
As should be expected with high book-to-market firms. the vast majority are within the 
bottom third of market capitalisation (68%) while just a few (7o/c) fall within the top size 
portfolio. Table 4 provides one-year market-adjusted returns based on these size categories. It 
is clear that none of the size partitions result in the high F _SCORE firms outperforming the 
high book-to-market firms that fall within that same size partition. What is fascinating is that 
only in the small firm partition do we see high F _SCORE firms outstripping low F _SCORE 
counterparts. It would thus be possible to further improve upon the high less low F _SCORE 
returns as evidenced in table 1 panels A through C by including a size partition. It should be 
noted that, while this partition does have some limited information content, Piotroski was 
able to show statistical significance in both the small and medium firm categories and thus 
gained far more value from this additional analysis. 
Classification of high book-to-market firms in to financial distress partitions brought even 
more differences to light. Piotroski found nearly half of his high book-to-market firms to be 
financially distressed and indeed, this would be in line with accepted norms for a portfolio 
comprised of these high book-to-market firms. This is not the case in South Africa with just 
28o/c of firms within the Piotroski high book-to-market portfolio falling within Altman's zone 
of financial distress. Once again, results are mixed. Firms identified as having low financial 
distress earn significantly stronger future returns than either high distress or intermediate 
distress firms. In addition, these firms earn future returns far in excess of both the market and 
a portfolio comprised of all high book-to-market firms. Disappointingly, this success does not 
transfer to high F _SCORE firms which now underperform the market and drastically 
underperform the average low distress firm. Despite the difference between low and high 
F _SCORE firms in this partition yielding the first statistically significant result thus far, 
both return sets are negative once adjusted for the market and thus little value is created. 
Finally, results for t+.ROA reflect the correlation with F _SCORE as determined in table 2. 
High and medium !:1ROA firms do not have low F_SCOREs while low t+.ROA firms do not 
have high F _SCOREs. !1ROA is thus further confirmed to be the best proxy for the aggregate 
F _SCORE should this be required. 
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TABLE 4 
aile-Year Market-A(Uusted Buy-and-Hold Returns to a Vallie Investment Strategy Based 
on Fundamental Signals by Size Partition {/ 
Small Firm ... Medium Firm.., Large Firm ... 
Mean Median n Mean Median II Mean Median Il 
All Firm ... 0.2482 -0.1334 235 -0.0546 -0.0906 88 0.1570 0.1309 24 
F_SCORE 
0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
1 -0.4088 -0.6733 7 0.6276 0.6276 2 0.1539 0.1539 1 
2 -0.0351 -0.2025 22 -0.1551 -0.1369 7 0.3230 0.3230 2 
3 -0.0697 -0.2307 41 -0.0686 -0.0009 16 -0.1645 -0.1645 2 
4 -0.1492 -0.2157 39 -0.1162 -0.l381 20 0.2059 0.2465 6 
5 0.0209 -0.1140 47 -0.0083 -0.0839 28 0.1679 0.1329 8 
6 0.8850 -0.0660 44 -0.1103 -0.1868 10 0.0772 -0.0151 4 
7 1.5057 0.0892 19 -0.0291 -0.1254 3 0.4101 0.410 I 
8 0.1524 -0.1334 11 -0.0641 -0.0641 2 N/A N/A 0 
9 0.0877 -0.2313 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
Low F_Score -0.4088 -0.6733 7 0.6276 0.6276 2 0.1539 O.IS39 
High F _Score 0.0642 -0.2353 17 -0.2973 -0.2973 3 -0.0461 -0.0461 
High less All -0.1841 -0.1019 -0.2427 -0.2067 -0.2032 -0.1770 
High less Low 0.4730 0.4381 -0.9249 -0.9249 -0.2000 -0.2000 
t -Statistic (High less All) 0.4752 0.1494 N/A 
t -Statistic (High less Low) 1.3466 1.0306 N/A 
"Each year, all companies having sufficient data to provide a credible F _SCORE which fall in to the high book-to-market LJuintile of the market are 
further allocated to size terciles with reference to the most recent financial year-end market capitalisation. This rrethod yiek:\s a small, rrediUIn and 
large company High book-to-market portfolio each year. All other definitions and statistics are as described in table 3. 
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TABLES 
Ability ofAltemative Historical Financial Measures to Differentiate Winners from Losers 
Panel ... A and B hclow illustratc thc rclationship hctwccn onc-ycar markct-adjustcd rcturns, financial distrcss and changc in profitahility. Each ycar, Altman's 
Z -Score is calculated from the most recent fiancial year-end data available. Companies are classified according to this Z- Score" as being either Highly 
di"tressed. moderately di"tressed or minimally di'itressed. Hi-;torical change in profitability i-; n~aslU'ed u ... ing L1 ROA as previously defmed. 
Panel A: Financial Distress 
High Distress Indetemrinate Di<;tress Low Distress 
Mean Median n Mean Median n Mean Median n 
AllFinn<; -0.0628 -0.1750 97 0.0226 -0.0752 55 0.3227 -0.0650 194 
Low F _Score 0.3554 0.1539 5 N/A N/A 0 -0.6459 -0.6979 5 
High F _Score -0.2173 -0.2582 5 -0.4381 -0.4381 -0.0257 -0.3151 15 
High less All -0.1545 -0.0833 -0.4607 -0.3629 -0.3484 -0.2501 
High less Low -0.5727 -0.4121 N/A N/A 0.6202 0.3828 
t -Stati<;tic (High less All) 0.7395 N/A 0.4526 
t -Stati<;tic (High less Low) 1.0326 N/A 2.8239 
Panel B: Historical Change in Profitability 
HighMOA MediumMOA LowMOA 
Mean Median 11 Mean Median 11 Mean Median II 
All Fimls 0.3759 -0.0998 108 0.2486 -0.0383 10') -0.0')55 -0.113') 10') 
Low Scorc N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 -0.2145 -0.5747 7 
High Score -0.1040 -0.3298 12 -0.0328 -0.1690 7 N/A N/A 0 
High less All -0.4799 -0.2300 -0.2815 -0.1308 N/A N/A 
High less Low N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
t -Stati-;tic (High less All) 0.5700 0.7395 N/A 
t -Stati ... tic (High less Low) N/A N/A N/A 
"A Z- Score above 2.99 is considered by Altman to signifY a financially sound company while a signal below 1.81 is considered to represent a financially 
distressed company. 
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4.4 HIGH BOOK-TO-MARKET FIRM EMPIRICAL ATTRIBUTES - SAMPLE 2 
Due to the inconclusive results achieved above through as strict an application of 
Piotroski's methodology as possible, it is necessary to consider alternative applications. It 
would appear from the online publication by PowerStocks Research 
(http://powerstocks.co.za!Piotroskilongtest.php) that it IS possible to apply the Piotroski 
F _SCORE effectively. Admittedly, no mention IS made of statistical significance and 
advantages noted may thus simply be sample specific. One key difference noted is the criteria 
applied for the selection of high book-to-market firms and inclusion of an analysis with 
reference to the market as a whole. Accordingly, Table 6 provides financial and return 
characteristics of firms having a book-to-market ratio greater than or equal to one. As a 
book-to-market ratio greater than one means that the net asset value of a firm exceeds its 
market capitalisation, this is felt to be a fair cut-off for high book-to-market classification. 
Classification on this basis results in fewer high book-to-market firms in years of economic 
prosperity but more in years of financial turmoil and stock market depression. Firms having a 
book-to-market ratio greater than or equal to one are selected from each financial year 
between 2005 and 20 I O. 
As can be seen in panel A of table 6, the average firm within this portfolio has a book-to-
market ratio of 1.7221 which is noticeably lower than that of the average firm in Piotroski' s 
high book-to-market portfolio as a result of additional high book-to-market firms being 
included in the sample. This extended sample in turn yields a slightly less favourable set of 
financial characteristics than evidenced previously and likewise a slightly diminished 12- and 
24-month return and market-adjusted return. Thus, once again we can see that firms having 
high book-to-market ratios tend to exhibit poor financial performance and yet the mean of 
each individual characteristic still tends to be positive indicating several financially superior 
firms outweighing the majority of financially weak firms. Panel B still shows that a portfolio 
comprised of high book to market firms does earn positive market-adjusted returns in the 
period following portfolio formations and that this is despite a majority of these firms earning 
negative market-adjusted returns. 
Eliminating these underperforming firms which form the majority of this and the previous 
high book-to-market portfolio will inevitably improve the portfolio's mean return 
performance. 
4.5 PIOTROSKI F _SCORE STRATEGY RETURNS - SAMPLE 2 
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Revised Spearman correlations between each individual Piotroski variable, one- and two-
year returns, one- and two- year market-adjusted returns and the combined F _SCORE for the 
amended sample of high book-to-market firms are presented in Table 7. Returns are still not 
as strongly correlated with F _SCORE as was evidenced in Piotroski' s paper and all 
correlations have declined slightly, once again a result of the extended sample. Still of 
concern is the stronger correlation between !J.LEVER and two-year market-adjusted returns 
and EQ_OFFER and two-year market-adjusted returns than F _SCORE and two-year market-
adjusted returns. This would seem to imply that over a longer investment period an aggregate 
financial performance measure may actually hold less value than an individual financial 
signal provided it is appropriately selected. 
Table 8 shows the returns available to an investor using a book-to-market ratio greater 
than or equal to one to construct a high book-to-market portfolio and then applying 
Piotroski's F_SCORE to this. Panel A provides raw return distributions for a l2-month buy-
and-hold investment strategy, Panel B provides market-adjusted return distributions over this 
same period and Panel C provides market adjusted return distributions for a 24-month buy-
and-hold investment strategy. 
Of interest is that despite the increase in sample size by 84 data points or 24%, the ratio of 
firms having unexceptional performance has not changed at all and the proportion of high and 
low F _SCORE firms has remained constant - once again confirming that the distribution of 
firms within a high book-to-market portfolio in South Africa differs to that as identified by 
Piotroski in America. Barring one or two anomalies, it is once again clear that higher the 90% 
confidence level. The single most remarkable change is that the proportion of firms 
generating a positive market return has increased dramatically in this revised high F _SCORE 
portfolio and now outweighs the proportion of low F _SCORE firms having a positive market 
return. 
F _SCORE firms tend to have positive market adjusted returns and lower F _SCORE firms 
tend to have negative market adjusted returns. This holds true for both 12- and 24- month 
return distributions. This relationship is in turn mirrored in the mean return of both the high 
and low F _SCORE portfolios. What is especially evident with this extended sample is that 
mean returns do seem to have shifted in a positive direction with every single percentile 
showing a slightly better return than that of the market and certainly better than that of low 
F _SCORE counterparts. This has resulted in very little difference between the mean return of 
a high F _SCORE portfolio and high book-to-market portfolio and a less pronounced but more 
consistent return over that of the low F _SCORE portfolio. 
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TABLE 6 
Financial and Return Characteristics of High Book-to-Market FimlS hm'ing 
a hook to market ratio greater than or equal to Of/e 
Panel A: Financial Characteristics 
Standard Proportion with 
Variable Mean Median Deviation Positive Signal 
MVE" 1425.1890 161.1300 4599.4637 N/A 
ASSETS h 6822.6914 538.6130 36700.3436 N/A 
BM' 1.7221 1.4707 0.7312 N/A 
ROA d 1.5930 0.0467 24.8155 0.7495 
i'lROA" 1.0262 -0.0066 26.0977 0.4388 
i'lMARGIN' -0.0163 -0.0046 2.4876 0.4458 
CFO" 0.4314 0.0344 6.7606 0.6932 
i'lL/QUID" -0.0055 -0.0280 8.1777 0.4574 
i'lLEVER' 0.0910 -0.0009 0.3944 0.5158 
i'lTURN' 1.4776 -0.0398 88.7338 0.3676 
ACCRUAL A -1.1635 -0.0004 24.6740 0.4967 
Panel B: Buy-and-Hold Returns for aD companies 
Proportion with 
Retum~ I Mean Median Positive Signal 
One- Year Retum~ 
Raw 0.2966 0.0929 0.5793 
Market-Adjll~ted 0.1199 -0.0510 0.4404 
Two- Year Returns 
Raw 0.6883 0.1032 0.5563 
Market-Adjll~ted 0.3460 -0.1860 0.4038 
In fact, this extension in sample size, despite leading to a slight deterioration in almost all 
financial and return characteristics as indicated in table 6, has negated the negative 
performance of high F _SCORE firms relative to a portfolio of high book-to-market firms as 
previously experienced and evidenced in table 3 and has resulted in a statistically significant 
difference between the low and high F _SCORE means over a 24-month investment period at 
Overall. it is clearly observable that F _SCORE can pick firms with poor future return 
performance and that both the market and high F _SCORE portfolio will substantially 
outperform these firms. In addition, it now appears likely that F _SCORE can pick firms with 
future returns at least equivalent to those returns realised by a portfolio of high book-to-
market firms and indeed, over a 24-month investment horizon it is even more likely than that 
a high F _SCORE portfolio will earn returns well in excess of those earned from a high book-
to-market portfolio. 
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4.6 RETURNS CONDITIONAL ON FIRM SIZE, FINANCIAL DISTRESS OR 
HISTORICAL CHANGE IN PROFITABILITY - SAMPLE 2 
As before, it remains to be seen whether or not further partitioning of data will indicate 
areas in which Piotroski's methodology and sample selection criteria can yield statistically 
significant or simply improved results and further support the application of Piotroski's 
F _SCORE as a viable investment screen. Firm size, level of financial distress and historical 
change in profitability will once again form the required partitions. Tables 9 and 10 present 
the various outcomes of these further partitions. 
The vast majority of high book-to-market firms are within the bottom third of market 
capitalisation (64%) while just a few (9%) fall within the top size portfolio. Table 9 provides 
one-year market-adjusted returns based on these size categories. With the introduction of 
additional high book-to-market firms in to the sample, medium size high F _SCORE firms 
now outperform their high book-to-market size counterparts. This is consistent with 
Piotroski's findings although there is still no statistical significance to support this 
observation and the fact that it does not extend to the small firm size portfolio sheds any 
significance of this finding in a doubtful light. What is however still evident is that only in the 
small firm partition do we see high F _SCORE firms outstripping low F _SCORE counterparts. 
It is thus still possible to further improve upon the high less low F _SCORE returns by 
including a size partition. 
Classification of high book-to-market firms in to financial distress partitions has become a 
much more rewarding task with the introduction of additional firms in to the sample. The 
table shows that firms in both the high and intermediate categories of distress earn negative 
market-adjusted returns and that F _SCOREs appear to have little informational content in 
these scenarios. However, low distress firms yield highly positive mean returns well in excess 
of the mean returns available to be earned by simply investing in a high book-to-market 
portfolio and in addition, a high F _SCORE portfolio comprised of low distress firms - while 
not performing as well as a portfolio of low distress but high book-to-market firms - does 
improve returns as compared to normal high F _SCORE firms by 73%. Note that it is still 
considered an anomaly that such a relatively small percentage of relatively high-risk high 
book-to-market firms are considered to be financially distressed. Also note the statistical 
difference between the mean return of high and low F _SCORE firms with low financial 
distress at the 95% confidence level. 
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TABLE 7 
Spearman Correlation Analysis hefl,l'eell One- alld Two-Year Market-Adjusted Returns. the Nine Fundamental Si/illals. and 
the Composite Si/ilwl (F _SCORE) for High Book-to-Market Firms with (/ book-to-market ratio greater thall or equal to olle (/ 
ROA tlROA M1ARGIN CFO &IQUID &EVER tlTURN ACCRUAL EQ OFFER F SCORE 
RETURN -0.019 -0.015 -0.005 -0.016 0.051 0.056 -0.006 0.015 0.085 0.099 
RETURN2 -0.025 -0.018 0.001 -0.016 0.019 0.157 -0.005 0.021 0.137 0.089 
MA_RET -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 -0.009 0.053 0.022 -0.004 0.004 0.085 0.104 
MA_RET2 -0.016 -0.009 0.013 -0.009 0.020 0.118 -0.003 0.013 0.131 0.095 
ROA 1.000 0.965 -0.004 0.157 0.003 0.044 0.240 -0.963 0.050 0.409 
tlROA 1.000 -0.003 0.153 -0.004 0.049 0.349 -0.928 0.053 0.542 
tlMARGIN 1.000 -0.006 0.040 -0.071 -0.008 0.003 0.031 0.517 
CFO 1.000 0.014 -0.017 0.690 0.116 -0.040 0.471 
tlL/QUID 1.000 -0.022 0.011 0.001 0.027 0.362 
tlLEVER 1.000 -O.()] 0 -0.047 O.ln 0.265 
tlTURN 1.000 -0.052 O'()O4 0.424 
ACCRUAL 1.000 -0.061 0.264 
EQ_OFFER 1.000 0.346 
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TABLE 8 
BI(v-and-Hold Rctums to a Value Investment Strategy Based on Fundamcntal Sig/wls 
Panel A: One-Year Raw Returns a 
Proportion with 
Mean 10% 25% 50% 75% ')0% Positive Signal n 
All Firm; 0.2%6 -0.658') -0.4757 -0.2570 -0.0') I') 0.0215 0.5791 430 
F_SCORE 
o (L) -0.1124 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1124 -0.1124 -0.1124 0.0000 
I (L) 0.1609 -0.6596 -0.5852 -0.4491 -0.2633 0.0216 0.4615 13 
2 0.0146 -0.6777 -0.5636 -0.3179 -0.1715 -0.0694 0.5405 37 
3 0.1410 -0.6139 -0.4584 -0.2565 -0.1013 0.0103 0.5278 72 
4 0.0532 -0.69') I -0.5246 -0.3048 -0.1442 -0.0344 0.5172 87 
5 0.1694 -0.6487 -0.4515 -0.2326 -0.0693 0.0397 0.6020 98 
6 out of6 0.2500 0.0000 0.0000 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 1.0000 
6 out of7 (H) 0.1670 0.0000 0.0841 0.0841 0.1670 0.1670 1.0000 2 
6 out of8 11.0476 0.0000 -0.8571 -0.4286 -0.4286 11.0476 0.3333 3 
6 out of') 0.2817 -0.5104 -0.3730 -0.1854 -0.0253 0.1004 0.5')32 5') 
7 out on (H) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
7 out of8 (H) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
7 out of') 1.1074 -0.3680 -0.1874 -0.0353 0.1339 0.2330 0.7813 32 
8 out 0[8 (H) 1.1000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.1000 1.1000 0.5000 2 
8 out of') (H) 0.250 I -0.4304 -0.2469 -0.0475 0.0707 0.250 I 0.8000 15 
9 out of9 (H) 0.2169 -0.4316 -0.3682 -0.1987 -0.0378 0.2169 0.5000 8 
Low F _Score (Ll 0.1414 -0.1124 -0.5079 -0.4382 -0.3087 0.0113 0.4286 14 
High F _Score (H) 0.2,)54 -0.614') -0.3740 -0.1447 -0.0070 0.0851 0.7143 27 
High less All -0.0012 0.0440 0.1017 0.1123 0.0850 0.0636 0.1352 
High less Low 0.1540 -0.5025 0.1340 0.2936 0.3018 0.0739 0.2857 
t -Statistic (High less All) 0.0051 
t -Statistic (High less Low) 0.6017 
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Panel B: One-Year Market-Adjusted Returns a 
Prop0l1ion with 
Mean 100/, 25% 500/, 75% <)0% Positive Sib'11al 11 
AllFirm~ 0.1199 -0.8278 -0.6417 -0.4249 -0.2595 -0.1491 0.4372 431 
r'-SCORE 
o (L) -0.1732 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1732 -0.1732 -0.1732 0.0000 
I (L) -0.0337 -0.9537 -0.81 <)7 -0.6<) 18 -0.4623 -0.1714 0.4615 13 
2 -0.1577 -0.8179 -0.6876 -0.4<)41 -0.3524 -0.23<)<) 0.3243 37 
3 -0.0673 -0.7935 -0.6506 -0.4620 -0.2998 -0.1947 0.3889 72 
4 -0.1059 -0.8141 -0.6684 -0.4533 -0.2938 -0.1<)19 0.4138 87 
5 0.0093 -0.8284 -0.6005 -0.3891 -0.2184 -0.1184 0.4694 98 
6 out of6 -0.0425 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0425 -0.0425 -0.0425 1.0000 
6 out of7 (H) -0.0571 0.0000 -0.0680 -0.0680 -0.057 I -0.0571 0.0000 2 
6 out of8 11.0067 0.0000 -0.8472 -0.2935 -0.2935 11.0067 0.6667 3 
6 out of9 0.1054 -0.6492 -0.4845 -0.3083 -0.1780 -0.0627 0.4576 59 
7 out of7 (H) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
7 out of8 (H) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
7 out 01'<) 0.8858 -0.7922 -0.5\42 -0.285<) -0.0889 0.022<) 0.5758 32 
8 out of8 (H) 1.033<) 0.0000 0.0000 -0.234<) 1.033<) 1.033<) 0.5000 2 
8 out of9 (H) O.0311 -0.5989 -0.4519 -0.2590 -0.1468 0.0311 0.5333 15 
<) out of<) (H) 0.\5<)7 -0.5680 -0.4558 -0.2567 -0.08\ <) 0.\5<)7 0.5000 8 
Low F _Score (L) -0'()437 -0.\732 -0.6946 -0.6647 -0.4360 -0.17\5 0.4286 \4 
High F Score (H) 0.1305 -0.7396 -0.4899 -0.2998 -0.\835 -0.0860 0.4643 27 
High less All 0.0106 0.0882 0.1518 0.1252 0.0760 0.0631 0.0271 
High less Low 0.1742 -0.5664 0.2047 0.3649 0.2525 0.0855 0.0357 
f -Statistic (High less All) 0.0523 
f -Statistic (High less Low) 0.6624 
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Panel C: Two-Year Market-Adjusted Returns a 
Prop0l1ion with 
Mean IOCJrJ 25% 50% 757< 1)0(Yc) Positive Si!,'11al 11 
AllFirm~ 0.3460 -1.1626 -0.9098 -0.6582 -0.4253 -0.2575 0.3160 307 
f,-SCORE 
o (L) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
1 (L) 
-0.4576 -1.4836 -0.6415 -0.6983 -0.7607 -0.6244 0.3000 10 
2 -0.2635 -1.2544 -1.0768 -0.8279 -0.5967 -0.4355 0.2759 29 
3 -0.1l76 -1.1476 -0.9849 -0.7207 -0.4786 -0.3068 0.3750 56 
4 -0.2132 -1.1017 -0.9239 -0.7280 -0.5369 -0.3860 0.3175 63 
5 1.1635 -1.2503 -0.8587 -0.5896 -0.3667 -0.2177 0.4063 64 
6 out of6 -0.5187 0.0000 0.0000 -0.5187 -0.5187 -0.5187 0.0000 
6 out of7 (H) 5.1953 0.0000 0.0506 0.0506 5.1953 5.1953 1.0000 2 
6 out of8 1.0954 0.0000 -0.4329 -0.1675 -0.1675 1.0954 0.6667 3 
6 out of9 0.4634 -0.1)1)1)4 0.4634 -0.4865 -0.2822 -0.1415 0.4545 44 
7 out of7 (H) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
7 out of8 (H) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
7 out of9 1.2301 -0.8738 -0.6593 0.7973 -0.1370 0.0348 0.5500 20 
8 out of8 (H) 0.0764 0.0000 0.0338 0.0338 0.0764 0.0764 1.0000 2 
8 out of I) (H) 0.3034 -0.6507 -0.4304 -0.0786 0.1327 0.2231) 0.7500 8 
I) out of I) (H) 0.1446 -0.1)832 -0.1)832 -O.3In -0.(51)5 0.1446 0.6000 5 
Low F _Score (L) -0.4576 -1.4836 -0.6415 -0.61)83 -0.7607 -0.6244 0.3000 10 
High F Score (H) 0.7319 -0.8169 -0.5907 -0.2420 -0.0367 0.0676 0.7647 17 
High less All 0.3851) 0.3456 0.31 I) 1 0.4162 0.3886 0.3251 0.4487 
High less Low 1.1895 0.6667 0.0508 0.4563 0.7241 0.6920 0.4647 
t -Statistic (High less All) 0.6347 
t -Statistic (High less Low) 1.8841 
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TABLE 9 
One-Year Market-Adjusted Buy-and-Hold Returns to a Value Investment Strategy Based 
Oil Fundamental Sigllals hy Si;:e Partitioll (/ 
SmallFirm~ MediumFiIm~ Large Firm~ 
Mean Median n Mean Median n Mean Median n 
All Fimls 0.1893 -0.1334 275 -0.0304 -0.0224 119 0.1109 0.0775 37 
F_SCORE 
0 N/A N/A 0 -0.1732 -0.1732 I N/A N/A 0 
-0.1847 -0.6005 10 0.6276 0.6276 2 0.1539 0.153Y I 
2 -0.1466 -0.2878 26 -0.3900 -0.2315 6 0.0633 0.0416 5 
3 -0.1067 -0.3000 45 0.0065 0.0138 22 -0.0377 -0.0752 5 
4 -0.1537 -0.2157 53 -0.1245 -0.0361 25 0.2269 0.2078 9 
5 -0.0079 -0.0998 56 0.0104 -0.0238 33 0.1129 0.1474 9 
6 0.8514 -0.0465 46 -0.0261 -0.0067 13 0.0430 -0.0249 6 
7 1.4350 0.1784 20 0.0025 -0.0378 II 0.2524 0.2524 2 
8 0.202Y -0.0459 12 0.0198 0.0442 5 N/A N/A 0 
Y 0.1139 -0.0446 7 0.479Y 0.47YY I N/A N/A 0 
Low F _Score -0.1847 -0.6005 10 0.3607 0.0491 3 0.1539 0.1539 
High F Score 0.1149 -0.0999 21 0.0965 0.1256 6 -0.0461 -0.0461 
High less All -0.0744 0.0335 0.126Y 0.147Y -0.1570 -0.1236 
High less Low O.2YY6 0.5006 -0.2642 0.0764 -0.2000 -0.2000 
t -Statistic (High less All) 0.1771 0.5531 N/A 
t -Statistic (High less Low) 0.9939 0.5851 N/A 
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TABLE 10 
Ahility of Alternative Historical Financial Measures to Differentiate Winnersfrom Losers 
Panel A: Financial Distress 
High Distress Indeterminate Di<;tress Low Di<;tress 
Mean Median Il Mean Median Il Mean Median n 
All Firm; 
-0.0622 -0.1442 115 -0.0724 -0.1077 77 0.2730 -0.0240 239 
Low F_Score 0.4506 0.1539 7 -0.3632 -0.3632 I -0.5671 -0.6856 6 
High F _Score -0.2173 -0.2582 5 -0.1582 -0.1582 3 0.2262 0.0863 20 
High less All -0.1552 -0.1141 -0.0858 -0.0505 -0.0469 0.1103 
High less Low -0.6680 -0.4121 0.2051 0.2051 0.7933 0.7719 
t -Statistic (High less All) 0.8192 0.0961 0.1847 
t -Stati<;tic (High less Low) 1.6006 N/A 3.2504 
Panel B: Historical Change in Profitability 
HighMWA MediwnMOA LowMOA 
Mean Median Il Mean Median Il Mean Median Il 
All Firm<; 0.0410 -0.0393 143 0.4499 -0.0167 144 -0.1258 -0.2008 144 
Low Score -0.1047 -0.1047 2 N/A N/A 0 -0.0335 -0.3739 12 
High Score 0.3001 0.1642 9 0.0425 -0.0684 17 -0.2012 -0.2012 I 
High less All 0.2591 0.2035 -0.4074 -0.0517 -0.0754 -0.0004 
High less Low 0.4048 0.2689 N/A N/A -0.1677 0.1727 
1 -Stati<;tic (High less An) 0.8858 1.1483 N/A 
1 -Stati<;tic (High less Low) 1.0517 N/A N/A N/A 
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Finally, results for !1ROA retlect the correlation with F _SCORE as determined in table 7. 
High and medium !1ROA firms tend not to have low F _SCOREs while low !1ROA firms tend 
not to have high F _SCOREs. !1ROA is thus further confirmed to be the best individual proxy 
for the aggregate F _SCORE. 
4.7 ALL FIRMS EMPIRICAL ATTRIBUTES 
The last sample against which to test the ability of Piotroski' sF_SCORE to separate 
winners from losers must simply be the market as a whole. The obvious lack of consistent 
and statistically significant results might be an indication of application to an inappropriate 
sample rather than lack of applicability of the technique. Table II provides financial and 
return characteristics for all companies listed on the JSE over the period 200S to 20 I O. 
Of particular interest is that general firm characteristic's of the market retlect those of high 
book-to-market firms but with less variability. This would imply that high book-to-market 
firms in South Africa do not have significantly different financial profiles. Year-on-year 
earnings, profitability, and turnover are all negative while leverage for the average firm has 
increased marginally. The fact that the mean market-adjusted return is negative for both a 12-
and 24-month period may appear strange but is in fact a result of missing data. Several 
companies had to be eliminated from both 2010 and 2009 for want of final share price data. 
In order to calculate returns for 12- or 24- months beginning S-months after financial year-
end share price data well in to 2011 would be required. In addition, several companies had to 
be excluded from this analysis due to insufficient financial information being readily 
available. 
4.8 PIOTROSKI F _SCORE STRATEGY RETURNS - SAMPLE 3 
Table 12 provides Spearman correlations for each of the 9 Piotroski indicator variables, 
the aggregate F _SCORE and market returns being both adjusted and raw. It is most 
interesting to note that now, unlike previously, F _SCORE is without doubt the variable most 
closely associated with future returns over both a 12- and 24-month period. As is to be 
expected, and also evident in all previous results, MOA, IlMARGIN as well as CFO are the 
Piotroski indicator variables with the most explanatory power for the aggregate F _SCORE 
but individually have little ability to explain future return performance. Table 13 lays out the 
returns available to an investor using Piotroski' sF_SCORE to select financially sound firms 
within the market-at-Iarge. While approximately 91.S% of the market falls within 
unexceptional F _SCORE categories and 6.S% of the market is considered to have a high 
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TABLE 11 
Financial and Retum Characteristics of all ISE listed companies 
Panel A: Financial Characteristics 
Standard Proportion with 
Variable Mean Median Deviation Positive Signal 
MVE" 14805.1130 1048.9755 68144.8946 N/A 
ASSETS" 18461.9232 998.3710 94665.5764 N/A 
8M' 0.7095 0.5315 0.8199 N/A 
ROA d 0.4744 0.0856 12.5251 0.8122 
II ROA' 0.0462 -0.0013 17.5855 0.4824 
llMARGIN' -0.0641 -0.0002 2.9126 0.4941 
CFO" 0.1006 0.0498 4.3378 0.7254 
llLIQU/D" -0.4071 0.0021 21.7358 0.5081 
llLEVER' 0.1036 -0.0006 0.4780 0.4861 
II TURN] 0.4488 -0.0002 45.5168 0.4828 
ACCRUAL /.. -0.3778 -0.0124 12.8188 0.4382 
Panel B: Buy-and-Hold Retul1l'i from a High Book-to-Market Investment Strategy 
Proportion with 
Returns I Mean Median Positive Signal 
One- Year Returns 
Raw 0.1902 0.0556 0.5526 
Market-Adjusted -0.0474 -0.1339 0.3629 
Two- Year Returns 
Raw 0.3206 0.0079 0.5040 
Market- Adjll<;ted -0.0556 -0.2658 0.3284 
F _SCORE, the number of financially weak firms has almost halved to just 1.8% of the total 
population. 
The positive relationship between F _SCORE and mean return as previously commented 
upon is still evident and the positive shift in the return distribution by investing in high 
F _SCORE firms is once again clear - if not in fact even clearer than before with all but one 
percentile bracket being positive for high as compared to all finns in the sample and low 
F _SCORE firms. Most importantly, high F _SCORE portfolios now outperform the market, 
population from which they are drawn and low F _SCORE firms without exception. It appears 
once again that an increased sample size allows for a more reliable and robust 
implementation of Piotroski' sF_SCORE. 
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TABLE 12 
Spearma/J Correlation Allalysis hetweell One- alld Two-Year Market-Adjusted Retruns. the Nine Fundamental SiXllllls. alld 
the Composite Sixnal (F _SCORE_for HiXh Book-to-Market Firms (/ 
ROA ~ROA MlARGIN CFO &IQUID &EVER ~TURN ACCRUAL EQ_OFFER F_SCORE 
RETURN -0.013 -0.001 -0.064 -0.008 0.013 0.052 0.000 0.010 0.067 0.033 
RETURN2 -0.016 -0.008 -0.069 -0.006 -0.001 0.132 -0.001 0.014 0.111 0.035 
MA_RET -0.005 0.005 -0.064 -0.003 0.015 -0.008 0.001 0.004 0.010 0.107 
MA_RET2 -0.010 -0.002 -0.063 0.001 0.002 0.054 0.002 0.010 0.052 0.088 
ROA 1.000 0.970 0.003 0.117 0.001 0.004 0.242 -0.942 0.023 0.387 
~ROA 1.000 0.002 0.161 0.003 0.033 0.306 -0.933 0.008 0.501 
~MARGIN 1.000 0.004 -0.004 -0.093 -0.001 -0.002 -0.023 0.497 
CFO 1.000 0.003 0.231 0.685 0.224 -0.034 0.504 
~LIQUID 1.000 -0.009 0.003 0.000 -0.016 0.308 
~LEVER 1.000 0.002 0.069 0.149 0.247 
~TURN 1.000 -0.055 0.005 0.449 
ACCRUAL 1.000 -0.034 0.222 
EQ OFFER 1.000 0.045 
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TABLE 13 
Buy-and-Hold Returns Based on Fundamental Signals 
Panel A: One-Year Raw Returns a 
PropOItion with 
Mean 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% Positive Signal 11 
AllFirm~ 0.1902 -0.6691 -0.4810 -0.2752 -0.1211 -0.0207 0.5543 1667 
F_SCORE 
_() QQ 15/ 
o (L) 
-0.1124 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1124 -0.1124 -0.1124 0.0000 
I (L) 0.0592 -0.7277 -0.6581 -0.4226 -0.2305 -0.0598 0.4828 29 
2 0.2367 -0.7738 -0.6496 -0.4366 -0.2750 -0.1694 0.4252 127 
3 0.1483 -0.6684 -0.4938 -0.2934 -0.1493 -0.0728 0.4856 243 
4 0.0999 -0.7216 -0.5453 -0.3412 -0.1829 -0.0842 0.4790 357 
5 0.0876 -0.6622 -0.4736 -0.2663 -0.1171 -0.0269 0.5740 385 
6 out of6 -0.1159 0.0000 0.0000 -0.4818 -0.4818 -0.1159 0.5000 2 
6 out of7 (H) 0.0385 -0.5931 -0.5086 -0.3490 -0.1631 -0.0408 0.4800 25 
6 out of8 3.7680 -0.6677 -0.4168 -0.2779 0.4089 3.7680 0.4000 10 
6 out of9 0.2138 -0.4552 -0.3038 -0.1416 -0.0041 0.0877 0.6429 238 
7 out of7 (H) 0.3107 -0.4239 -0.1991 -0.0530 0.1735 0.3107 0.8000 5 
7 out of 8 (H) 1.0619 0.0000 0.6953 0.8145 0.8145 1.0619 1.0000 3 
7 out of9 0.3968 -0.5137 -0.3079 -0.1326 0.0080 0.1072 0.7073 164 
8 out of 8 (H) 1.1000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.1000 1.1000 0.5000 2 
8 out of9 (H) 0.2682 -0.4818 -0.2677 -0.0586 0.0769 0.1803 0.7895 57 
9 out of9 (H) 0.1095 -0.4822 -0.3716 -0.2593 -0.0793 0.0045 0.3684 19 
'Low F _Score (L) 0.0535 -0.5458 -0.6092 -0.4603 -0.2512 -0.1156 0.4667 30 
High F Score (H) 0.2216 -0.5558 -0.4188 -0.2020 -0.0372 0.0789 0.6577 III 
c 
() L11() 
High less All 0.0314 0.1133 0.0623 0.0732 0.0839 0.0996 0.1034 
High less Low 0.1681 -0.0100 0.1904 0.2583 0.2140 0.1944 0.191O 
t -Statistic (High less All) 0.4807 
t-Statistic (High less Low) 1.2149 
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Panel C: Two-Year Market-Adjusted Retmm a 
Proportion with 
Mean 1090 25% 50% 75% <)0% Positive Sit,'11al 11 
AllFinn~ -0.0556 -1.l382 -0.8765 -0.6550 -0.4340 -0.2991 0.3562 1342 
F_SCORE 
o (L) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
I (L) 
-0.3778 -1.4<)84 -1.2634 -0. <)5<)0 -0.6<) 17 -0.4887 0.3750 24 
2 0.123<) -1.2047 -0.<)892 -0.7812 -0.5876 -0.4274 0.2816 103 
3 -0.0926 -1.2297 -0.9902 -0.7137 -0.4980 -0.3533 0.3299 194 
4 -0.1045 -1.2688 -0.9712 -0.6108 -0.5116 -0.38US 0.3045 289 
5 0.1153 -1.0313 -0.8118 -0.5955 -0.4161 -0.2874 0.3378 299 
6 out of6 -0.5226 0.0000 -0.5264 -0.5264 -0.5226 -0.5226 0.0000 2 
6 out of7 (H) 0.0<)55 -0.9697 -0.8796 -0.7258 -0.5596 -0.4278 0.2<) 17 24 
6 out of8 0.2526 -1.3229 -1.0308 -0.7313 -0.5747 -0.0879 0.3636 11 
6 out of9 0.1201 -0.9506 -0.6940 -0.4765 -0.2880 -0.1690 0.4384 203 
7 out of7 (H) -0.1710 0.0000 -0.5524 -0.3513 -0.3513 -0.1710 0.3333 3 
7 out 0[8 (H) 0.3205 0.0000 -0.8362 -0.2052 -0.2052 0.3205 0.6667 3 
7 out of<) 0.1867 -0.88<)8 -0.7432 -0.45<) I -0.2710 -0.1303 0.4567 127 
8 out of8 (H) 0.0764 0.0000 0.0338 0'(l338 0.0764 0.0764 1.0000 2 
8 out of9 (H) -0.0255 -0.7705 -0.5821 -0.4146 -0.2722 -0.1450 0.4000 45 
<) out of<) (H) -0.0275 -0.8609 -0.6587 -0.4141 -0.2517 -0.1 m<) 0.4615 13 
Low F _Score (L) -0.3778 -1.4<)84 -1.2634 -0.9590 -0.6917 -0.4887 0.3750 24 
High F _Score (H) 0.0038 -0.9071 -0.72<)4 -0.5458 -0.3644 -0.2545 0.4000 <)0 
High less All 0.0594 0.2312 0.1472 0.1092 0.0696 OJ)447 0.0438 
High less Low 0.3815 0.5913 0.5340 0.4132 0.3273 0.2342 0.0250 
t -Statistic (High less All) 0.1882 
t -Stati~tic (High less Low) 1.9535 
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TABLE 14 
One-Year Market-Adjusted BlIy-and-Hold Returns to an investment Strategy Based 
on FlIndamental Signals hy Si:;e Partition <I 
Small Firms Mediwn Firm~ Large Firm; 
Mean Median 11 Mean Median 11 Mean Median 11 
All Firm<; 0.2241 -0.1425 559 -0.0869 -0.1292 558 -0.0491 -0.0607 553 
F_SCORE 
0 N/A N/A 0 -0.1732 -0.1732 N/A N/A 0 
1 -0.1494 -0.4358 13 -0.0462 -0.1298 9 0.0518 0.0586 6 
2 0.5806 -0.2177 54 -0.3222 -0.2784 37 -0.1065 -0.1531 36 
3 0.0448 -0.3000 101 -0.1055 -0.1258 77 -0.0435 -0.0666 68 
4 0.1193 -0.2007 117 -0.1706 -0.1685 115 -0.1090 -0.0864 127 
5 -0.1148 -0.1857 110 -0.0675 -0.1090 136 0.0161 -0.0130 136 
6 0.5285 -0.0465 86 -0.0063 -0.0862 89 -0.0740 -0.0588 99 
7 0.8644 0.0892 47 -0.0073 -0.0763 66 -0.0210 -0.0629 61 
8 0.1349 -0.1034 22 0.1047 0.1073 22 -0.0490 -0.1328 16 
9 0.1045 -0.0446 9 -0.0568 -0.2128 6 (1.0986 0.1318 4 
Low F _Score -0.1494 -0.4358 13 -0.0589 -0.1515 10 0.0518 0.0586 6 
High F Score -0.0526 -0.3434 40 0.1129 -0.0783 40 -0.1389 -0.0479 29 
High less All -0.2767 -0.2008 0.1998 0.0509 -0.0899 0.0129 
High less Low 0.0968 0.0925 O.171S 0.0732 -0.1908 -0.1065 
t -Statistic (High less All) 1.1842 2.1544 0.7835 
t -Statistic (High less Low) 0.7921 0.5277 0.3322 
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TABLEtS 
Ahility o{ Alternative Historical Fi/lancial Measures to Differentiate Winners from Losers 
Panel A: Financial Distress 
High Distress 
Mean Median 
All Firm" 0.1115 -0.1199 
Low F_Scorc 0.0396 -0.1109 
High F _Score 0.4642 0.4411 
High less All 0.3527 0.5609 
High less Low 0.4246 0.5519 
t -Statistic (High less AD) 0.7051 
t -Statistic (High less U)w) 0.1503 
Panel B: Historical Change in Profitability 
HighMOA 
Mean Median 
All Firm<; 0.1399 -0.1273 
U)W Score N/A N/A 
High Score 0.0144 -0.2165 
High less All -0.1255 -0.0892 
High less Low N/A N/A 
t -Stati"tic (High less All) 0.9549 
n 
431 
19 
29 
11 
518 
0 
81 
Indeterminate Di<;tress 
Mean Median n Mean 
-0.0968 -0.0779 173 0.0103 
-0.1495 -0.1495 2 -0.4079 
-0.0238 0.5894 14 -0.6683 
0.0730 0.6673 -0.6787 
0.1257 0.7389 -0.2604 
0.9124 0.5786 
0.6974 2.6921 
MediumMOA 
Mean Median 11 Mean 
-0.0243 -0.0610 519 0.0075 
0.3383 0.0643 3 -0.1466 
2.2758 2.3609 21 -0.0907 
2.3000 2.4219 -0.0982 
1.9375 2.2966 0.0560 
2.0356 N/A 
t -Statistic (High less Low) N/A 0.4064 N/A 
Low Distress 
Median 11 
-0.1092 1083 
-0.2385 9 
-0.9772 81 
-0.8680 
-0.7387 
Low MOA 
Median 11 
-().1170 519 
-0.2385 21 
-0.0907 1 
0.0264 
0.1478 
"A Z- Score above 2.99 is considered by Altman to signify a financially sound company while a signal below 1.81 i" considered to represent a financially 
di<;tressed company. 
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4.9 RETURNS CONDITIONAL ON FIRM SIZE, FINANCIAL DISTRESS OR 
HISTORICAL CHANGE IN PROFITABILITY - SAMPLE 3 
Partitioning of data is illustrated in tables 14 and IS. Partitions based on firm size no 
longer hold any true information content with signals being contradictory between partitions. 
The only valuable observation is that the small firm size category is the only category able to 
yield positive mean market-adjusted returns over the period. 
As with partitioning of data based on firm size, partitioning of data based on financial 
distress no longer seems to hold much informational content. In fact, high distress firms are 
shown to have positive mean market-adjusted returns while low and indeterminate distress 
firms have minor positive and large negative mean returns respectively. Perhaps of most 
relevance to this anomaly is the fact that high F _SCORE firms in the high distress 
category are responsible for significant future returns well above returns available in the 
market. Provided firms having a high F _SCORE are in fact financially sound, these 'highly 
distressed' firms when classified using a Z-Score will likely have been unfairly penalised for 
this presumed sorry financial state and will later recover allowing for the share price to 
rebound. Finally, a high F_SCORE firm with either high or medium MOA appears to have 
the best opportunity for superior returns. 
5. Conclusions 
Application of the Piotroski F _SCORE to the South African market is an unconfirmed 
success. While it is possible to collect data and analyse this in a manner consistent with 
Piotroski methodology, it is difficult to do so without making certain adaptations. Data, and 
the number of years over which this analysis can be conducted, are at a premium due to the 
stringent requirements imposed by Piotroski's selected variables and return functions. A 
couple of variables require the use of opening balances for the two years preceding portfolio 
formation and the BFA McGregor data set found to most reliably present Piotroski required 
line items is not available prior to 2004. In order to retain 2005 / 2006 data for analysis 
purposes it has been necessary to manually collect the data points for these additional 
variables in the 2003 and 2002 financial years. As returns are calculated with reference to a 
starting date five-months following year-end, several companies having otherwise viable data 
are not available for anaylsis due to 12- and 24-month return periods falling outside of the 
currently available data. 
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Further, in an effort to retain as many individual company data points as possible, it was 
necessary to manually alter the calculation of variables like .'J.MARGIN and /'t,.LEVER in 
situations where data was insufficient or inadequately detailed. This was done by including 
data proxies intended to have similar information content to that of the original Piotroski 
variable. While this improved upon the number of Piotroski variables available for 
calculation for each firm, a substantial number of firms still had less than the prescribed nine 
variables. As the sample size against which the application of Piotroski' s methodology would 
be appropriate was rapidly shrinking it became necessary to adapt the criteria for selection of 
a low and more particularly high F _SCORE firm. All firms having more than 5 indicator 
variables available for analysis were considered and classified based on number of Piotroski 
variables out of the total number present for each firm. Firms having a or I positive Piotroski 
variables out of a minimum of 6 were classified as having a low F _SCORE and firms having 
a or I indicator variables below the total number present for that firm - provided greater than 
5 - were classified as having a high F _SCORE. After all these allowances, adaptations and 
manual interventions there were still just 346 data points available for analysis as compared 
to some 10,000 used by Piotroski. 
The resultant outcomes were admittedly disappointing. While it was possible to observe 
certain positive relationships between F _SCORE and mean returns within both market-
adjusted and raw returns. these observations were not statistically significant nor did they 
provide particularly consistent or robust arguments for the creation of a high F _SCORE 
portfolio. In fact, the only real conclusions that could be drawn with any degree of confidence 
are that low F _SCORE portfolios consistently underperform both the market and high 
F _SCORE portfolios regardless of investment horizon and that investment on the basis of a 
Piotroski F _SCORE could conceivably hold substantial benefit in the longer term. It is noted 
that this ability to further strip away underperforrning firms from the overall high book-to-
market investment strategy does in itself hold value due to the impact this will have on the 
revised portfolio mean. What was most certainly evident, as is to be expected based on prior 
research, is that a portfolio of high book-to-market firms does significantly outperform the 
market 
Once it was established that firm size, level of financial distress and historical profit 
performance could not yield additional value from this initial application of Piotroski's 
methodology to the South African market it became apparent that further samples should be 
tested. All conceivable and reasonable adjustments had been made to ensure as many data 
points and as pragmatic an application of Piotroski' sF_SCORE as possible but the sample 
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upon which this methodology was applied appeared to limit the descriptive ability of this 
measure. 
This observation was supported by Piotroski backtesting performed by PowerStocks 
Research where a very positive return result was obtained using similar methodology but 
noticeably different selection criteria. With this in mind the sample upon which to test the 
Piotroski methodology described in this paper was altered to include not just the upper 
quintile of high book-to-market firms but all firms having a book-to-market ratio greater than 
or equal to one. These firms, with a net asset value equal to or exceeding their market 
capitalisation, in themselves contained some information content about the underlying 
market. In times of high stock returns fewer firms met the definition of a high book-to-market 
firm while in periods of financial uncertainty and lacklustre stock performance many-more 
high book-to-market firms became available. 
This revised sample selection criteria also managed to extend the sample size and, once 
results were obtained, did seem to lend credence to the assumption that the Piotroski 
methodology was likely sound but that the limited sample upon which it was initially applied 
was arguably incorrect. While high F _SCORE firms did not suddenly consistently outperform 
the high book-to-market portfolio within which they fell, in all cases the revised results 
showed at least a negligible difference between these two alternative portfolios and did in fact 
yield positive results when applied to market-adjusted 12- and 24- month returns. For the first 
time it was clearly observable that the distribution of high book-to-market firm returns had 
indeed been shifted upward and a statistically significant difference between high and low 
F _SCORE portfolios was evident over a 24-month period. It was also clear that high 
F _SCORE firms only outperform low F _SCORE firms when both firms are small in size. 
Once again, some value can be garnered by removing high F _SCORE firms of medium and 
large size prior to analysis as this will further improve the high versus low F _SCORE 
disparity and could be used to yield positive returns in a long / short strategy. 
Finally, when applying the Piotroski F _SCORE to the market as a whole, it is evident that 
an extended sample does most certainly show the intended. albeit more diluted. results as 
initially demonstrated by Piotroski. These include an upward shift in the mean returns of a 
high F _SCORE portfolio over and above those of the market and low F _SCORE firms. It is 
also plain to see that in all instances high F_SCORE firms now outperform both the market 
and low F _SCORE firms and, although not by a particularly large margin over a 12-month 
period. that cumulatively these excess returns would quickly compound in to a significant 
abnormal return. Size, financial distress and historical profit performance do however lose 
Page 51 of 55 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 To
wn
any descriptive ability they once had as a result of the entire sample of firms available for 
testing in the market being tested. 
Overall. this paper sought to establish whether or not Piotroski's methodology could be 
implemented in a South African context and if so where most value could be gained. It would 
appear that this methodology can indeed be implemented in South Africa provided some 
attempt is made to adequately address data and analysis issues. It would also appear that there 
are observable benefits evident. some of which are substantial. That said. these observations 
are not by-and-large supported by statistical significance and it may be unwise to rely upon 
them without also including additional research or analysis. Key findings that should be 
subjected to further research include improved mean market-adjusted portfolio returns for 
small firms and those firms showing low financial distress. Focussing on the intersection of 
these two characteristics may have astonishing results. 
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